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ABSTRACT
The consensus around shareholder primacy is crumbling. Investors, long
assumed to be uncomplicated profit-maximizers, are looking for ways to express
a wider range of values in allocating their funds. Workers are agitating for
greater voice at their workplaces. And prominent legislators have recently
proposed corporate law reforms that would put a sizable number of employee
representatives on the boards of directors of large public companies. These
rumblings of public discontent are echoed in recent corporate law scholarship,
which has cataloged the costs of shareholder control, touted the advantages of
nonvoting stock, and questioned whether activist holders of various stripes are
acting in the company’s best interests. Academics who support stronger
shareholder rights are accused of pandering to special interest groups or
naively seeking a panacea in a plebiscite.
As critical theorists have documented over time, the foundations of the
shareholder primacy model have always been compromised. In particular, the
arguments for a core feature of the modern corporation—the exclusive
shareholder franchise—have been revealed as the product of flawed
assumptions, misapplied social choice theory, and a failure to hold true to the
fundamental precepts of standard economics. It is time to look at such
governance features anew, and reorient the literature around the basic purpose
of corporations: to provide a legal mechanism for business firms to engage in
the process of joint production.
In this article, we present a new shared governance model, one that builds
on the longstanding theory of the firm as well as a novel theory of democratic
participation. These twin arguments, economic and political, both counsel in
favor of extending the corporate franchise to employees as well as shareholders,
and, importantly, provide a way to distinguish these two constituencies from
other corporate stakeholders when it comes to governance rights. We conclude
by assessing the current status of a shared governance system in Germany and
advocating for further theoretical and empirical inquiry into organizational
governance structures that provide for joint shareholder and employee
participation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a remarkable moment in corporate law. Everything is about to change.
The status quo of shareholder primacy clings stubbornly on, full of its old power
in appearance, and yet it is a façade. It is the Soviet Union after the fall of the
Berlin Wall. It is Persia after Thermopylae, the British Raj after the Salt March,
disco after the Ramones. We are at the beginning of the end.
This claim may seem absurd in light of the dominance of shareholder
primacy theory throughout the United States, the European Union, and
developing nations. The academic network behind shareholder primacy remains
resolute; almost all corporate law scholarship pivots around the central idea of
shareholder control.1 It is almost twenty years since Henry Hansmann and
Reinier Kraakman’s declaration about the end of corporate law history, 2 and
shareholder wealth maximization remains the governing norm.
But underneath the superficial agreement is a roiling mass of disputes and
divisions. The field is more fractured than ever before. The prospect of real
shareholder empowerment, through proxy access or shareholder bylaws, has
split the academy into subgroups that advocate for divergent approaches.3
Activist investors have gone from the saviors of shareholder rights4 to short-term
Ann M. Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, 44 J. CORP. L. 297, 300 (2019) (“Most
modern theories of the corporation subscribe to what is known as ‘shareholder
primacy,’ i.e., the notion that directors have, or should have, a commitment to manage
the corporation in a manner that benefits the shareholders.”).
2
See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view
that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”).
3
See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 1, at 300 (discussing “sharply divergent views of the
precise nature of directors’ legal obligations”). The Bainbridge-Bebchuk debate over
the role of shareholder participation in management is one example. Compare Lucian
A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 835
(2005) (arguing that shareholders should have increased governance power), with
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) (advocating for a director primacy
model).
4
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge
Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1089 (2015) (noting research in finance that
1
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opportunists who should be marginalized.5 Money is being shoveled like never
before into passive index funds and exchange-traded funds—the absentee
landlords of stock ownership.6 Important recent scholarship focuses on the
problems of “principal costs” generated by investor governance7 and touts the
advantages of nonvoting shares.8 Leaders in the field such as Nobel Laureate
Oliver Hart,9 Michael Jensen,10 and Delaware Chief Justice Leo Strine11 are
“public disclosures of the purchase of a significant stake by an activist are accompanied
by significant positive stock-price reactions as well as followed by subsequent
improvements in operating performance”); Mark Hulbert, A Good Word for Hedge
Fund
Activism,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
18,
2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/business/yourmoney/18stra.html.
5
See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System,
126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1874 (2017) (discussing the dangers of hedge-fund activism);
James B. Stewart, Hedge Funds Should Be Thriving Right Now. They Aren’t., N.Y.
TIMES (July 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/business/hedgefunds.html.
6
See, e.g., Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP.
L. 493, 494 (2018) (noting that millions of investors have moved their money from
actively managed mutual funds to passively managed funds); Bryan Borzykowski, The
trillion-dollar ETF boom triggered by the financial crisis just keeps getting bigger,
CNBC.COM, Sept. 14, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/14/the-trillion-dollar-etfboom-triggered-by-the-financial-crisis.html (“In 2008, U.S. investors had $531 billion
in ETFs; that’s jumped to more than $3.4 trillion today, according to Statistica.”).
7
Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law
and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 770 (2017).
8
Dorothy S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71 STAN.
L. REV. 687, 694-700 (2019).
9
Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not
Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN & ACCT. 247, 248 (2017).
10
Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate
Objective Function, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 2010, at 32, 33 (arguing that
corporations should pursue “maximization of the long-run value of the firm” rather than
shareholder wealth maximization).
11
Leo E. Strine Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism: A Comprehensive
Proposal to Help American Workers, Restore Fair Gainsharing Between Employees and
Shareholders, and Increase American Competitiveness by Reorienting Our Corporate
Governance System Toward Sustainable Long-Term Growth and Encouraging
Investments in America’s Future (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion
Paper No. 1018, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3461924
(opining that “[t]he incentive system for the governance of American corporations has
failed in recent decades to adequately encourage long-term investment, sustainable
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questioning the stability of shareholder primacy as a regulatory norm. The
corporate-law centre cannot hold.
Now that shareholder primacy is losing its grip on the corporate world, for
the first time in a very long time we can start to see the outlines of what will
come after. The next wave in corporate governance is coming, and it will include
workers. For too long, labor has been left outside of the corporate governance
gates. But we now see concrete examples of the coming change. Recent bills
proposed by Senators Tammy Baldwin and Elizabeth Warren provide workers
with representation on the board of directors.12 The Walkout for Change by
Google workers demanded, in part, the appointment of an employee
representative to Google’s board.13 The German system of codetermination,
where workers elect up to half the members of the corporate supervisory board,
showed its strength and resilience in the recovery from the global economic
crisis.14 And new managerial methodologies providing for participatory
management and employee voice are increasingly popular around the globe.15
Policymakers, workers’ advocates, and workers themselves are looking anew at
the corporate structure and asking why workers have been left out.
Despite these murmurings of fundamental change, corporations have more
legal and economic power than ever before. Over the last decade, corporate
profits have hovered between nine and eleven percent of the U.S. gross domestic

business practices, and most importantly, fair gainsharing between shareholders and
workers.”); Hon. Leo E. Strine, Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional
Investors to Prevent the Illegitimate Use of Working Americans’ Savings for Corporate
Political
Spending,
Working
Paper,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3304611 (arguing that “Worker
Investors” have different interests than purely financial investors and that fund
managers have a fiduciary duty to represent these hybrid interests when exercising the
voting power of the shares).
12
Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018); Reward Work Act, S.
2605, 115th Cong. (2018).
13
Noam Scheiber, Google Workers Reject Silicon Valley Individualism in Walkout,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/business/googleemployee-walkout-labor.html.
14
See Part IV.C infra.
15
See, e.g., FREDERIC LALOUX, REINVENTING ORGANIZATIONS: A GUIDE TO
CREATING ORGANIZATIONS INSPIRED BY THE NEXT STAGE OF HUMAN
CONSCIOUSNESS (2014); BRIAN J. ROBERTSON, HOLACRACY: THE NEW
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD (2015).
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product—the highest sustained average percentage on record.16 Recent tax
changes have dramatically slashed corporate tax bills and returned billions of
dollars to corporate coffers.17 And the power of the corporate form continues to
expand. By providing corporations with individualized constitutional and
statutory rights of expression, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Citizens
United18 and Hobby Lobby19 have extended the corporation’s powers even more
deeply into politics, religion, and culture.
Within the corporation, the shareholder franchise has long been the critical
control feature. No other group of corporate constituents—employees,
bondholders, customers, or suppliers—possesses anything close to this level of
control over firm decisions. The justifications for this exclusivity are well worn
at this point, even if they remain somewhat slippery. One model describes the
corporation as a nexus of freely bargained contracts, and therefore
presumptively the most efficient way to structure firm governance.20 Another
justification is that shareholders are owners of the corporate residual, and they
16

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Research, Corporate Profits After Tax
(without
IVA
and
CCAdj)/Gross
Domestic
Product,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=1Pik; see also Tim Worstall, Why Have Corporate
Profits Been Rising as a Percentage Of GDP? Globalisation, FORBES, May 7, 2013,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/05/07/why-have-corporate-profitsbeen-rising-as-a-percentage-of-gdp-globalisation/#6a27a3fb2a6e. At the same time,
workers’ wages and salaries have reached their lowest percentage of GDP. Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Research, Compensation of Employees: Wages
and Salary Accruals/Gross Domestic Product, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=2Xa;
Michael Madowitz & Seth Hanlon, GDP Is Growing, but Workers’ Wages Aren’t,
CENTER
FOR
AMERICAN
PROGRESS,
July
26,
2018,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2018/07/26/454087/gdpgrowing-workers-wages-arent/.
17
An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent
Resolution on the Budget for the Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C) (known as the “Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act of 2017”) (cutting the corporate tax rate from 35% to 20%).
18
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
19
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
20
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA
L. REV. 1, 9 (2002) (“The dominant model of the corporation in legal scholarship is the
so-called nexus of contracts theory.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989) (“The corporation is a
complex set of explicit and implicit contracts, and corporate law enables the participants
to select the optimal arrangement for the many different sets of risks and opportunities
that are available in a large economy.”).
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have the appropriate incentives to make good firm decisions.21 Rights to the
residual provide shareholders with a common interest in maximizing corporate
profits, which reduces their tendency to squabble about firm decisions and
allegedly eliminates the possibility of having voting cycles infect board
elections.22 Scholars who believe in shareholder wealth maximization but
nevertheless believe in centralized board authority have tinkered around the
edges of these standard economic accounts by emphasizing the importance of
board or managerial discretion.23
But these traditional arguments for the shareholder franchise are falling
apart—not just from criticisms by outsiders, but through conflicts from inside
the house. It is well-recognized now that shareholders across the board have
heterogeneous, rather than homogenous, interests that diverge along a number
of dimensions.24 Scholars are losing trust in shareholders with significant
power,25 and there is even support for nonvoting shares and passive
shareholding.26 Those academics who support strengthened shareholder power

21

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 67-68 (1991) (justifying the corporate franchise based on
shareholders’ interests in the residual)
22
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 405 (1983) (discussing KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963)).
23
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3.
24
See Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 791 (describing “several sources of conflict
among shareholders, including differing investment horizons and needs for cash
payouts, empty voting, and competing outside interests”); Grant M. Hayden & Matthew
T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 505 (2008) (“It is becoming increasingly clear, for example,
that shareholders have many different types of interests in a corporation.”).
25
Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2008) (“[A]ctivist shareholders are using their growing influence
not to improve overall firm performance, as has generally been assumed, but to profit
at other shareholders’ expense.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and
Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1750 (2006) (“[S]hareholder
voting is properly understood not as a primary component of the corporate
decisionmaking structure, but rather as an accountability device of last resort, to be used
sparingly, at most.”).
26
Lund, supra note 8, at 697-98; Lund, supra note 6, at 497 (arguing that passive funds
should not have voting rights).
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are accused of supporting special interests and shadow agendas.27 The house of
the exclusive shareholder franchise is collapsing in on itself.
With the standard economic approaches on the ropes, we’d expect to see
alternatives rise to fill the gaps in corporate governance theory. But there is a
dearth of such alternatives. Most progressive scholars have to this point have left
the shareholder franchise alone and cross their fingers for more ecumenical firm
decisionmaking.28 Stakeholder advocates have not put forth convincing
theoretical distinctions among constituencies that might tell us which group
preferences are best captured by governance and which by contract.29 The
growth of B-Corps and benefit corporations has created a parallel corporate
ecosystem outside of the traditional one where shareholder primacy can been
watered down or diminished—but not replaced.30 Even those who dare to dream

27

See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 1754 (claiming that Lucian Bebchuk’s
argument for shareholder empowerment would help “precisely the institutions most
likely to use their position to self-deal--that is, to take a non-pro rata share of the firm's
assets and earnings--or otherwise to reap private benefits not shared with other
investors”); Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A
Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 451 (2014) (“Bebchuk is the sincere champion of one group of
‘agents’ wielding power and authority over others’ money—the money managers who
control most of the investments belonging ultimately to ordinary Americans who are
saving to pay for their retirements and for their children’s education—against another
group of ‘agents’ that he believes is somehow more conflicted--the agents who actually
manage corporations that make real products and deliver useful services (i.e.
‘productive corporations’).”).
28
See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 290-91 (1999) (describing directors as trustees for
stakeholders).
29
Kent Greenfield has come the closest to proposing a redesigned board of directors,
but he did not lay out specifics. See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF
CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 112
(2006) (“The specifics will be difficult but not impossible: employees could elect a
proportion of the board; communities in which the company employs a significant
percentage of the workforce could be asked to propose a representative to the board;
long-term business partners and creditors could be represented as well.”).
30
Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681,
682 (2013) (“Enthusiasts argue social enterprises will have a more positive and
sustainable impact on people and planet than ordinary for-profit businesses.”); Heerad
Sabeti, The For-Benefit Enterprise, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2011, at 98.
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big have—up to now—checked their expectations at the door.31 Forces are
amassing but still scattered and diffuse.
The reconstruction of corporate governance theory, at minimum, needs to
reassess which stakeholders should have their preferences captured through the
most powerful feature of corporate control—voting—and, just as importantly,
which should not. To answer this question, we will return to the theory of the
firm and reconsider the purposes of corporations and what that means for
governance. We will also develop a new theory of democratic participation
designed to assess which interested parties should have their preferences
captured through an electoral process. Both of these theories—the economic
theory of the firm and the political theory of democratic participation—support
a model that incorporates employees expressly into the inner sanctum of
corporate governance. And both of these theories also give us the tools to
distinguish between insiders—shareholders and employees—and other
stakeholders whose interests in a typical corporation are best captured in ways
other than voting rights.
In sum, this article catalogs the main shortcomings of existent corporate
governance theory and proposes a shared governance model of the firm to
replace it. We begin, in Part II, by recounting the intellectual foundations of the
shareholder primacy norm that dominates current corporate law scholarship. In
doing so, we will focus on the core feature of that norm—the exclusive
shareholder franchise—and the arguments put forth in support of it. These
arguments have a range of problems: they are based on a number of faulty
empirical assumptions; they misapply basic economic and social choice theory;
and, in the end, they often rely on a bit wishful thinking on the part of legal
scholars determined to paper over the cracks in their theories. This has left the
scholarly case for shareholder voting—most of which comes out of the law-andeconomics tradition—on the verge of collapse.
In the central sections of the article, we develop a theory of shared corporate
governance. In Part III, we begin to reconstruct corporate governance
scholarship by returning to and reinvigorating the longstanding theory of the
firm. This theory, born out of a desire to explain why business firms exist apart
from markets in the first place, is not only consistent with but actually militates
in favor of greater employee participation in corporate governance. As
31

Brett H. McDonnell, Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate Governance, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429, 442 (2011) (stating that “large legal changes that would
strongly encourage or mandate significant employee involvement [in corporate
governance] are politically quite unlikely to succeed”).
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participants in joint production, those employees should also have voting rights
within the firm. In Part IV, we develop a new theory of democratic participation
that helps explain which corporate constituents should be extended the corporate
franchise rights (and, just as importantly, which should not). This theory, fully
consistent with mainstream democratic theory and informed by voting rights
jurisprudence, also counsels in favor of extending voting rights to employees in
ordinary corporate governance situations. We will also examine the example of
German codetermination as an empirical proof of concept. In the end, the
economic theory of the firm and the democratic theory of participation provide
the foundation for a new vision of corporate governance, one that includes
workers and shareholders, labor and equity, for the benefit of all corporate
stakeholders.
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ITS DISCONTENTS
A. Shareholder Primacy and the Exclusive Franchise
Shareholder primacy, a version of corporate governance that assigns
priority to shareholder interests above all others, has been the consensus
governance model in corporate law for at least thirty years, and arguably for over
a century.32 The exclusive right of shareholders to elect the board of directors
has been around even longer, dating back to the proliferation of corporations in
the nineteenth century.33 But while corporate law currently embodies both of
these governing principles, they are not necessary components of the corporate
form.
Under our federalized system, corporations are creatures of state corporate
law. Even though state corporate law allows for a great deal of organizational
flexibility, actual governance structures are remarkably uniform. Delaware
corporate law, for example, does not even require a corporation to have a

Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A2d 345, 360 (Del 1993) (“(D)irectors are
charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corporation and
to act in the best interests of its shareholders.”). See also E. Norman Veasey, Should
Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate Governance Practices--or
Vice Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. Rev. 2179, 2184 (2001) (stating that Delaware law adopts
the norm of shareholder primacy).
33
See Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the
History of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1351-53 (2006)
(noting that shareholders have had voting power extending back to the earliest of
corporations).
32
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board,34 and yet all corporations have them. The board controls the firm and has
the ability to legally bind the corporation to its decisions.35 Shareholders elect
the directors at the annual shareholders meeting by in-person voting or the use
of proxies.36 Directors must act in the corporation’s interests and are bound by
certain fiduciary duties, primarily good faith, care, and loyalty.37 However,
directors generally delegate the actual job of running the business to the officers,
primarily through a hierarchy of employees headed by the chief executive officer
(CEO).38 This structure—shareholders elect the directors, who in turn select the
officers to run the corporation—replicates itself in corporations from every state.
And the critical feature of corporate governance control—who gets to vote,
about what, and under what circumstances—has also been fixed: the corporate
franchise belongs to shareholders and shareholders alone.
Shareholders have held the right to vote within the corporation since its
inception.39 Although shareholder primacy has its roots in the early case of
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,40 it did not achieve full flower until the law and
economics movement in corporate law, combined with the advantageous tax
treatment of stock options.41 By the mid-2000s, the shareholder primacy norm
oriented not only academic theory but also boardroom practice.
34

Id. § 141.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(1)–(2).
36
Id. § 211(b).
37
Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 86 (Claire Hill & Brett
McDonnell eds., 2012).
38
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (“Every corporation organized under this
chapter shall have such officers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the
bylaws or in a resolution of the board of directors which is not inconsistent with the
bylaws . . . .”).
39
Dunlavy, supra note 33, at 1351-53.
40
170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
41
Shareholder primacy proponents touted the importance of stock-oriented
performance incentives for management to provide the proper incentives. See, e.g.,
Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay,
But How, 68 HARV. BUS. REV. 138 (1990). In 1993, the tax code was amended to
prohibit the deduction of executive compensation over $1,000,000 unless it was
performance-based. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2012). See Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling
Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 879
(2007) (“The purpose of this legislation was to enhance shareholder wealth in two ways:
by reducing the overall level of executive compensation and by influencing the
composition of executive compensation arrangements in favor of components that were
more sensitive to firm performance.”). The end result was a dramatic increase in the use
35
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The classic justification for the shareholder franchise is that shareholders
are the “owners” of the corporation and therefore should have the right to control
it.42 The law and economics justification has centered around the shareholder’s
right to the “residual”—namely, the residual profits remaining after all other
claimants have been paid.43 Because they are paid “last,” the argument goes,
they have the best set of incentives for governing the company.44 Along with the
shareholder primacy norm, the “nexus of contracts” theory of the corporation is
also popular in economics and legal academic circles.45 Under this theory, the
corporation does not really exist and instead should best be considered as cluster
of contractual agreements among a variety of parties. The nexus of contracts
approach counsels for a “hands-off” or default-rule approach to corporate law,
as the corporation is conceived as a set of voluntarily-chosen relationships
between different parties.46
In their foundational work on the law and economics of corporate law,
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel married these two theories into a simple,
intertwined structure. Their book, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law,47
reaffirmed the shareholder primacy norm by arguing that shareholders are the
most economically vulnerable of the firm’s participants. This vulnerability,
coupled with their shared preference for wealth maximization, means that
shareholders should be accorded the basic governance rights of the
of stock options in executive compensation. Id. at 906 (“It is widely believed that §
162(m) contributed significantly to the explosion of compensatory stock options that
began in the late 1990s.”).
42
Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1189, 1190-92 (2002). This is one of the “bad” arguments. Id.
43
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 67 (“The reason [that shareholders vote]
is that the shareholders are the residual claimants to the firm’s income.”).
44
See MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 21 (1995) (“Because shareholders
are in this residual claim position, most economists argue that they have the greatest
incentive to see that the company makes good business decisions and uses its assets
wisely to earn profits.”).
45
See generally Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Voting and the
Symbolic Politics of Corporation as Contract, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511 (2018).
46
Cf. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis,
84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990) (developing the “triviality hypothesis”—namely,
that “appearances notwithstanding, state corporate law is trivial: it does not prevent
companies—managers and investors together—from establishing any set of governance
rules they want”).
47
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21.
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corporation.48 Thus, Easterbrook and Fischel contended, the other participants
in the corporation agreed, through their own contracts, to provide shareholders
with residual rights to the corporation’s profits and the voting rights that come
with them.49 The shareholder primacy norm provided the overriding purpose to
the corporate form, while the nexus of contracts theory demonstrated how the
parties have reached this arrangement through voluntary agreements.
From this core law and economics framework have blossomed divergent
approaches to some of the central corporate debates of the last twenty years. One
group of theorists, most prominently Lucian Bebchuk, focused on providing
shareholders with stronger legal powers within the corporation.50 Such powers
include power over corporate political spending, the right to access the
company’s proxy ballot, and a prohibition on staggered boards.51 Others, such
as Steven Bainbridge’s director primacy theory52 and Margaret Blair and Lynn
Stout’s team production theory,53 rallied around various versions of board
primacy. While these board primacy scholars disagree with each other on the
appropriate goals of the corporation, they all believe that a governance system
that’s less responsive to shareholders will allow the board to make better
decisions.54
Significantly, all of these theorists, like Easterbrook and Fischel before
them, are committed to corporate governance structures in which shareholders
alone elect board members and vote on other matters of importance. The original
justifications for the exclusive shareholder franchise, many of which are now
more than four decades hold, continue to be cited, recited, and relied upon by
the universe of scholars of corporate governance.55

48

Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 17, 37.
50
See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 3.
51
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for
Shareholder Access: A Response to the Business Roundtable, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
557 (2005); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and A Reply to
Symposium Participants, 55 STAN. L. REV. 885 (2002)
52
Bainbridge, supra note 3.
53
Blair & Stout, supra note 28.
54
See Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious
Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2089-92 (2010).
55
Including us.
49
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B. Cracks in the Foundational Arguments
While Easterbrook and Fischel’s arguments for the shareholder franchise
continue to hold sway, substantial cracks have appeared in their foundations. As
we catalog these arguments and some of their shortcomings, it is important to
realize that our critiques do not question the basic principles of standard
economics or social choice theory thought to underlie them. Instead, we take
those principles as given, and discuss their misapplication in the context of
corporate governance. It’s our sense that corporate governance scholars often
start from basic economic principles only to discard them when it they run into
(what they perceive as) problems. These arguments, in other words, will be
evaluated by the standards that their proponents set for themselves.
1.

The Contractarian Argument

One of the most basic arguments for the exclusive shareholder franchise is
that it, like any feature of corporate governance, is presumptively efficient
because it is the product of freely bargained contracts. 56 In this view, the
corporation itself is nothing more a nexus of contracts.57 Although it often hard
to tell whether the corporation as contract is intended to be a literal or
metaphorical description, there is no doubt that it has done heavy rhetorical work
in the service of the law and economics vision of the corporation. If all corporate
constituents agree to a governance system in which shareholders alone have
voting rights, who’s to say they’ve got it wrong?
Over time, even the most die-hard contractarians have conceded that this
description of the corporation is not literally true—there are some key features
56

This argument is given extensive treatment in Hayden & Bodie, supra note 45; Grant
M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of “Nexus of
Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2011); Michael Klausner, The
Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779
(2006); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 301 (1999); Lewis A.
Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on
Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449 (1989); William W. Bratton, Jr.,
The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV.
(1989).
57
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976)
(providing the original description of the theory); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
supra note 21, at 1-39 (providing one of the most prominent iterations of the theory).
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to modern corporations that cannot be reduced to contract.58 The most prominent
of these is the signature feature of the corporate form: limited liability.59 Limited
liability cannot be replicated by contract, but is instead, a concession granted by
the state to corporations in exchange for the ability to tax and regulate them in
various ways.60 Corporations are not reducible to a set of contracts; indeed, if
contracts were sufficient, then there would be no need for corporate law in the
first place.61
As corporate governance theorists shifted to using the nexus of contracts
more metaphorically, their reliance on contract theory becomes somewhat selfdefeating.62 Easterbrook and Fischel, for example, argue that corporate law
provides the “ideal” contract that most participants would themselves develop,
saving the parties from the transaction costs of developing it on their own.63 This
argument, though, proves too much, as the theory then assigns itself with the
task of assigning preferences—something that economists are generally loath to
do. Moreover, the preferences of these particular hypothetical constituents do
not reflect the preferences of actual constituents, even the shareholders
themselves. And there’s certainly no independent reason to think that the rest of
the corporate constituents would agree on such particularized governance
features like the exclusive shareholder franchise.64
This contractarian theory of the corporation turns out to be based on
idealized, fictionalized versions of shareholders and other corporate
constituents. And these fictional constituents, by and large, just happen to agree
with normative law and economics principles and the current structures of

58

LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 67-75 (2010) (describing the
mandatory elements of the corporate structure); Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law,
and Science in the Corporate Field: A Critique of Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530,
1537 (1989) (“Admittedly, as a descriptive matter state corporation codes and other
sources of law contain many mandatory terms that parties cannot contract around....
[T]o claim that contractarians would deny the existence of coercive legal rules is to
accuse them of blindness or stupidity.”).
59
See RIBSTEIN, supra note 58, at 79; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 56, at 1137-39.
60
See RIBSTEIN, supra note 58, at 138; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 56, at 1138.
61
Hayden & Bodie, supra note 56 (“A corporation is not a contract.”).
62
For a more complete description and critical evaluation of this move to metaphor to
save the contraction position, see Hayden & Bodie, supra note 45, at 538-46.
63
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 20, at 1418 (discussing how “much of
corporate law is designed to reduce the costs of aligning the interests of managers and
investors”).
64
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 45, at 539-41.
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corporate governance.65 But their supposed approval of every contemporary
feature of corporate governance is nothing more than Panglossian wish
fulfillment on the part of their creators. In the end, this argument in favor of the
exclusive shareholder franchise is both descriptively wrong and normatively
hollow.
2.

The Residual Argument

The principle that all shareholders have a similar interest in the corporate
residual, the leftover operating profit after all the costs have been paid, has long
been central to the idea of shareholder voting.66 Because maximizing the
residual maximizes the return to shareholders while leaving all other
constituents (like creditors, employees, and suppliers) contractually satisfied,
under this theory shareholder control over a corporation will increase efficiency
by maximizing residual profits.67
According to shareholder primacy theory, shareholders are best positioned
to be assigned the vote because they have relatively homogeneous interests in
maximizing the residual. More specifically, they alone have a single-minded
focus on corporate profits.68 Over the last couple of decades, however, this
assumption of shareholder homogeneity has broken down.69 Many shareholders
have interests in the firm that go beyond a simple desire to maximize the
residual, including majority shareholders, shareholders with disproportionate
voting rights, members of voting trusts, bribed shareholders, hedged
shareholders, sovereign wealth funds, and employee and management
shareholders.70 In each case, those shareholders have interests that may temper
or override their shared interest in the residual. In addition, shareholder
heterogeneity is not simply a matter of shareholders with discrete competing
interests. There is also heterogeneity among otherwise similarly situated
shareholders with respect to their definitions of wealth maximization—

65

See id. at 541-42. For a more extensive discussion of this idea, see Daniel J.H.
Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: “For Whom is the Corporation Managed,”
Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996).
66
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 67-69.
67
See id. at 35-39; 67-69.
68
See id. at 69-70.
69
See Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 791; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 505.
70
See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53
UCLA L. REV. 561, 574-92 (2006); Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 477-98.
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shareholders, for example, with different time horizons or risk preferences.71
Defined-benefit pension funds have a definition of wealth maximization that
would lead to different outcomes than a hedge fund, or a flash trader.
The recent importance of environmental, social, and governance (ESG)
investing highlights another problem with shareholder primacy. As economists
should recognize, shareholder wealth maximization is not the same thing as
shareholder utility maximization. Shareholders do in fact value things other than
profit maximization, and corporate governance should be structured to allow
them to express their preferences on tradeoffs in corporate decisionmaking.72
The recent surge in ESG investing provides tangible evidence of disparate
shareholder interests, with these funds estimated to represent one-quarter of the
funds under management—roughly $12 trillion.73 Surveys show that threequarters of Americans have an interest in sustainable investing—evidence that
nonmaximizing investments may continue to grow.74 In fact, misguided notions
that shareholder wealth maximization is a required investing strategy may be
artificially propping up wealth maximization approaches.75
Finally, it is simplistic to say that shareholders are the only ones with an
interest in the long-term value of the corporation. Employees may receive more
discrete and regular payments, but they too have an ongoing interest in the
success of the operation. Assuming that employees are paid by “contracts” that
71

See Anabtawi, supra note 70, at 579-83; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 492-94.
For a thoughtful review of the short-termism debate, see Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley,
Short-Termism and Long-Termism 12-21 (Va. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 2,
2016).
72
Hart & Zingales, supra note 9.
73
See Mark Miller, Bit by Bit, Socially Conscious Investors Are Influencing 401(k)’s,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/27/business/esg-401kinvesting-retirement.html.
74
See Paul Sullivan, Investing for Social Impact Is Complicated. Here Are 4 Ways to
Simplify It., N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/03/yourmoney/impact-investing-standards.html; see also Dieter Holger, What Generation Is
Leading the Way in ESG Investing? You’ll Be Surprised., WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-generation-is-leading-the-way-in-esg-investingyoull-be-surprised-11568167440 (noting that millennials have the highest percentage
of interest in ESG investing, but that Gen X is catching up in interest and likely has
more ESG assets under management).
75
Susan N. Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term: Fiduciary Duties and ESG
Integration, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 731, 734-35 (2019) (“[D]ue to outdated
understandings of ‘social investing,’ some decision makers still worry that any strategy
that considers environmental or social impacts will breach their fiduciary duties.”).
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are set in economic stone makes it easy to ignore that over time, the corporate
power of shareholders puts workers at a significant bargaining disadvantage.76
If shareholders alone elect the board, then the board will naturally favor the will
of their electorate.77 This dynamic has played out over time: wages have
remained stagnant despite a booming economy, while corporate profits have
grown at a staggering rate.78 Employees may have some market power, but they
also have firm-specific capital that cannot be moved, and they generate the value
that the firm holds through its brand, trademark, and good will.79 Because
shareholders control the company, they control the brand, the goodwill, the
ongoing business. Combined with the at-will rule and the dramatic decline in
union representation, employees have remarkably little power within the firm,
despite their ongoing interest in the business.
3.

The Arrow’s Theorem Argument

Shareholder heterogeneity also undercuts another fairly prominent
argument for the exclusive shareholder franchise: the argument from Arrow’s
theorem. Easterbrook and Fischel first raised concerns, based on Kenneth
Arrow’s impossibility theorem, that corporate constituents with heterogeneous
preferences would be more likely to produce intransitive election results, or
voting cycles.80 This, in turn, would lead firms to “self-destruct.”81 This
76

BLAIR, supra note 44, at 256-57.
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose II: An Encouragement for
Future Consideration from Professors Johnson and Millon, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1165, 1177 (2017) (“The boards of these corporations did not view themselves as
having any national loyalties or loyalties to other constituencies, they viewed
themselves as elected officials in the republic of equity capital.”)
78
See Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since
1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data (NBER Working Paper No. 20625,
2014), available at http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/SaezZucman2014.pdf (discussing
diverging income inequality); Floyd Norris, Corporate Profits Grow and Wages Slide,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
4,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/05/business/economy/corporate-profits-grow-everlarger-as-slice-of-economy-as-wages-slide.html (discussing the rise in corporate profits
and fall of employee compensation).
79
Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the Boundaries of the Firm, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 363 (2009) (“The positive reputation associated with a
trademark is due to the work of many persons associated with the firm owning that mark
over time.”).
80
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 69-70.
81
Id. at 70.
77
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argument has since been repeated by a wide range of law and economics
corporate governance scholars.82
As discussed earlier, shareholders actually have quite heterogeneous
preferences with respect to corporate decisionmaking. But the Arrow’s theorem
argument falls apart long before we get to the nature of shareholder preferences:
it is based on a misguided application of the theorem from the start.83 First, even
if shareholders agree on an underlying goal of wealth maximization, that does
not mean they agree on the best strategies or board candidates to achieve that
goal.84 Second, the argument ignores the enormous democratic cost of avoiding
possible voting cycles: prohibiting interested parties from voting based upon
their purported preferences.85 Third, the argument utterly fails to analyze the
likelihood or cost of cyclical election outcomes in corporate elections, and under
some fairly straightforward assumptions, both are likely to be very low or
nonexistent.86 The argument from Arrow’s theorem for the exclusive
shareholder franchise is not at all compelling.
4.

The Argument for Board Primacy

Competing corporate law theories in the law and economics tradition
sometimes offer more realistic stories about corporate law doctrine. But they
also do little to question the underlying structures of corporate control.87 Stephen
Bainbridge’s “director primacy” theory well describes the ambivalence of
Delaware corporate law towards the relationship between shareholders and the
board of directors.88 But his theory ultimately fails to explain why directors
should be given relatively unchecked authority over the operation of the firm.89
82

See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 41-42 (1996); Blair
& Stout, supra note 28, at 257; Gregory K. Dow, The New Institutional Economics and
Employment Regulation, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP 57, 69 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997).
83
For a critical evaluation of this argument, see Grant Hayden & Matthew Bodie,
Arrow’s Theorem and the Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1219
(2009). For a condensed version, see Hayden & Bodie, supra note 45, at 524-30.
84
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 83, at 1230-32.
85
See id. at 1232-34.
86
See id. at 1234-39.
87
For an overview and critical evaluation of the various forms of board primacy theory,
see Hayden & Bodie, supra note 56.
88
See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and
Practice (2008).
89
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 56, at 2089-92.
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Similarly, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s “team production” model accurately
takes into account the many participants in the life of the corporation.90
However, their model also leaves it to shareholder-elected board to somehow
manage these relationships appropriately.91
Whether they be “Platonic guardians” (Bainbridge)92 or “mediating
hierarchs” (Blair and Stout),93 there are no governance structures in place to
ensure that actual directors live up to the faith that these accounts place in their
ability to manage the firm for all constituents. In both cases, the ultimate check
on the board is left in the hands of the shareholders alone. And both simply rely
on earlier law and economics argument to justify the retention of the exclusive
shareholder franchise.94 Those committed to board primacy provide no
independent arguments for this fundamental mechanism of corporate control.
C. New Challenges for the Primacy Model
Along with the flaws in the traditional law and economics model for
corporate law, there are new concerns about the tremendous weight placed on
shareholders within the model: specifically, the idea of shareholder wealth
maximization as the focus of the enterprise, as well as the ability of shareholders
to handle their governance responsibilities. These developments provide
additional momentum for rethinking corporate governance.
1. A Return to Corporate Purpose
Since the early twentieth century, the idea that a corporation has a particular
“purpose” for itself has pretty much been a nonstarter. But corporate law
originally required corporations to establish a specific purpose as part of the
incorporation process.95 The purpose specified the nature of the business to be
established and provided a sense of scope. In a real sense, the purpose

90

See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 28.
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 56, at 2089-91, 2112-20.
92
Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 560.
93
Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 280.
94
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 56, at 2101-2111.
95
Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 554-55 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“At first,
corporations could be formed under the general laws only for a limited number of
purposes . . . .”).
91
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established the legal boundaries of activities for participants within the firm.96
The purpose requirement was enforced through a legal action based on ultra
vires, or “beyond the powers.” Under this doctrine, shareholders could sue the
corporation if it went beyond the scope of its purpose, as established in the
charter.97 Because it limited the reach of corporate power to enumerated
purposes, the ultra vires doctrine was “an important tool to protect the state’s
interest in restricting the power and size of corporations and to protect the
shareholders from managerial overreaching.”98
As corporations became more commonplace and less attention was paid to
the specific charters, the ultra vires doctrine began to break down. Although
ultra vires prohibitions remain on the books in almost every state,99 corporations
learned to have as broad a corporate purpose as possible.100 Today, even though
corporations are allowed to have specific purposes, for-profit companies
generally follow specific language: the corporation is formed to conduct and
transact all lawful business activities allowed under the laws of the state.101 The
goal of shareholder wealth maximization became de rigueur at all
corporations.102
96

JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 60 (Arno Press Inc. 1972) (“[T]he general powers of a
corporate body must be restricted by the nature and object of its institution.”).
97
Adam J. Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, A Prod, and A Big Stick: An
Evaluation of Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals, and the Ultra Vires Doctrine as
Methods for Controlling Corporate Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 929, 930 (2005)
(“The ultra vires doctrine historically allowed a shareholder to sue to prevent a company
from engaging in an activity outside of the specific parameters of its corporate
charter.”).
98
Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality
(with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA.
L. REV. 1279, 1302 (2001).
99
Sulkowsi & Greenfield, supra note 97, at 945 (“The incorporation statutes of fortynine states allow these states to dissolve a corporation or enjoin it from engaging in ultra
vires activities--that is, activities outside of the corporation’s authority.”).
100
See, e.g., Recent Cases, Corporations - Ultra Vires: What Acts Are Ultra Vires - IllDefined Objects of Incorporation, 32 HARV. L. REV. 285, 290 (1919) (discussing a
corporate purpose “enabling the company to carry on almost every conceivable kind of
business which such an organization could adopt”).
101
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held
U.S. Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 611, 618 (2017).
102
Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
2003, 2004 (2013) (“Many, and possibly most, public companies now embrace a
shareholder-centered vision of good corporate governance that emphasizes
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However, there is a growing sense that corporations should have goals that
go beyond merely the creation of wealth for equity holders. Some scholars
propose refocusing the aims of the corporation largely within existing legal
structures. Ronald Colombo, for example, suggests that corporate directors
exercise their agency obligations on behalf of the shareholder owners in a way
consistent with an Aristotelian understanding of ownership—one that that takes
account of the common good and, by implication, the interests of other
stakeholders.103 Other approaches involve the creation of new legal structures
for the expression of these goals. One example is the growth of business
organizations tailored to include socially beneficial purposes. Benefit
corporations are a form of business organization created by state statutes to
promote a more socially-responsible orientation within the business.104 The
signal change from corporation to benefit corporation is its rejection of the
shareholder primacy norm for a more socially-beneficial corporate purpose. This
purpose must fit within the rubric of “social benefit” as defined by the state

‘maximizing shareholder value’ (typically measured by share price) over all other
corporate goals.”). See also eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34
(Del. Ch. 2010) (“Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are
bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards
include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders.”).
103
See Ronald J. Colombo, Ownership, Limited: Reconciling Traditional and
Progressive Corporate Law via an Aristotelian Understanding of Ownership, 34 J.
CORP. L. 247 (2008); see also Susan J. Stabile, The Catholic Vision of the Corporation,
4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 181, 186 (2005) (arguing for a corporate purpose that takes
account of human dignity as grounded in Catholic social thought). Without proposing
any real changes in the legal regime, however, it’s difficult to see how these attitude
changes would be accomplished.
104
See Matthew J. Dulac, Sustaining the Sustainable Corporation: Benefit
Corporations and the Viability of Going Public, 104 GEO. L.J. 171, 175 (2015) (“A
benefit corporation is a for-profit corporation with a stated public benefit that operates
in a responsible and sustainable manner; in other words, it pursues the dual mission of
making a profit and achieving some social good.”). See Brett McDonnell, Benefit
Corporations and Strategic Action Fields or (The Existential Failing of Delaware), 39
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 263, 280 (2016) (“State statutes legally define benefit corporations.
These statutes sit atop the basic business corporation statute. That is, benefit
corporations are business corporations, subject to all of the rules of the business
corporation statute, except insofar as the benefit corporation statute provides different
or additional rules.”).
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statute. Although most states provide a relatively broad definition,105 state
benefit corporation law usually includes some mechanisms for enforcing the
“benefit” component, such as benefit reporting, a benefit officer, fiduciary duties
related to the benefit, or ultra vires actions if the purpose is ignored.106
Traditionally-organized companies are also feeling pressure to adopt
purposes and principles beyond maximizing shareholder wealth. There is, of
course, the possibility that such efforts are primarily for public relations. 107 But
there seems to be an increasing interest in authentic efforts to make a business
about more than simply making money. At companies that follow participatory
or self-managed internal governance, the purpose of the organization becomes
the core around which the organization operates.108 Corporate social
responsibility experts argue that the principles and purpose should be baked into
the corporation’s everyday operations.109 Focusing on a purpose above and
beyond shareholder wealth challenges the driving spirit of shareholder primacy.
2.

Principal Costs & Shareholder Disengagement

Dual-class voting structures at such tech titans as Facebook and Google, as
well as the previously untested waters of nonvoting shares as distributed in by
Snap, Inc., have raised anew the wisdom of deviating from the traditional oneshare, one-vote paradigm.110 Traditionally, corporate governance advocates
have seen the one share, one vote paradigm as inviolate, and have pressured
Delaware defines public benefit as “a positive effect (or reduction of negative
effects) on 1 or more categories of persons, entities, communities or interests (other
than stockholders in their capacities as stockholders) including, but not limited to,
effects of an artistic, charitable, cultural, economic, educational, environmental,
literary, medical, religious, scientific or technological nature.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 362 (2016).
106
Heminway, supra note 101, at 618.
107
See Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate
Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV.
983, 985 (2011) (identifying the problem of “faux CSR”).
108
See Matthew T. Bodie, Holacracy and the Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 619, 635 (2018).
109
V. Kasturi Rangan, Lisa Chase & Sohel Karim, The Truth about Investors, HARV.
BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2015, https://hbr.org/2015/01/the-truth-about-csr (contending that
the main goal of CSR practices should be “to align a company’s social and
environmental activities with its business purpose and values”).
110
Steven Davidoff Solomon, Snap’s Plan Is Most Unfriendly to Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/snap-ipoplan-evan-spiegel.html.
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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441307

2020]

THE CORPORATION REBORN

25

companies to eschew dual-class or non-voting share structures. However, there
has been a recent and somewhat surprising trend towards a theoretical
justification for deviations from the one-share, one-vote scheme.
It is no accident that these arguments come at a time when investments in
massive, passive index funds is increasing apace.111 Index funds exist solely to
own shares to an established set of financially successful companies while
charging fees that are as low as possible. Any effort to investigate the issues at
play in any particular election, or—in extreme circumstances—to run and fund
a proxy challenge to incumbent directors, will cost the fund’s participants while
providing benefits to participants in the other index funds, who spend nothing.112
Such activity will redound to the detriment of the particular fund, as all funds
get the benefit but only the particular fund incurs the cost.113 In a world where
the index sets the investment portfolio, funds compete on cost, and every extra
analyst becomes an unnecessary luxury.
The extraordinary growth of index funds causes substantial problems to a
corporate governance model based on the shareholder franchise. Voting rights
require information to be meaningful. If a voter is not informed on the choice at
hand, the voter will not make a rational choice. Either the voter will still vote,
introducing whimsy and capriciousness into the process, or the voter will
abstain. Neither option is effective if the system is built on informed choice and
the resulting market discipline.
In response to these funds with large masses of insensate stock holdings,
corporate law scholars have pushed back against the assumptions of the
traditional law and economic model. In developing their theory of “principal
costs,” Zohar Goshen and Richard Squire argue that the field has been too
focused on agency costs—namely, the inefficiencies generated by the delegation
of control from shareholders to directors and managers.114 They point out that
shareholder governance decisions can lead to “competence costs,” arising from
lack of information or talent, and “conflict costs,” relating to the conflicts
between different goals within the shareholder group.115 Shareholders delegate
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Lund, supra note 6, at 494.
Id. at 495.
113
Id.
114
Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 769 (using the term “agency-cost essentialists”
for scholars who “treat the reduction of agency costs as the essential function of
corporate law”).
115
Id. at 770-71.
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their governance authority to management in order to address these costs.116 In
particular, shareholder competence costs grow as shareholders become less
knowledgeable about the corporation and its leadership. The problem of ignorant
equity holders is so severe in Dorothy Lund’s view that she argues for regulatory
restrictions on voting rights for large, passive funds.117 Excluding their shares
from the voting pool will give a larger role to more informed and deserving
shareholders.118 If voting rights are useless or restricted, then shareholders may
begin to question their value. Nonvoting shares—an unspeakable taboo for
modern corporate law—may actually be a better deal if shareholders do not have
the information sufficient to translate their preferences into voting choices.119
These new approaches deeply unsettle shared premises of modern corporate
law theory. And they do so working within the shared normative framework of
shareholder primacy. One might expect that at least some scholars would have
proposed even more radical deviations from settled corporate law doctrine. Alas,
thus far, that has not been the case.
D. The Stakeholder Alternative
In contrast to shareholder primacy, the stakeholder model of the
corporation, also called the communitarian or multifiduciary model,120 proposes
that corporate governance should take all stakeholders in the corporate
enterprise into account, rather than limiting governance power to
shareholders.121 As an oppositional theory, stakeholder theory has largely served

Id. at 771 (“[P]rincipal costs are more fundamental than agent costs, as the goal of
reducing them is the reason that investors delegate control to managers . . . .”).
117
Lund, supra note 6, at 497.
118
Id.
119
Lund, supra note 8, at 745.
120
See Simone M. Sepe, Directors’ Duty to Creditors and the Debt Contract, 1 J. BUS.
& TECH. L. 553 (2007) (noting that “communitarians . . . advocate a multifiduciary
model where all corporate stakeholders benefit from the attribution of directors'
fiduciary duties”). See also David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law:
Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 11-12
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (discussing the use of the multifiduciary model by
communitarian corporate law scholars).
121
See Millon, supra note 119, at 11-12 (discussing efforts to provide protections to
nonshareholder constituencies); Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 293-94 (arguing that
directors owe a duty to the corporation and that the corporation consists of all of the
stakeholders who are responsible for the business of the enterprise).
116
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to act as a rhetorical brake on some of the excesses of shareholder primacy.122
But it often ends up reinforcing the status quo. If anything, stakeholder theory
expands upon the discretion provided to the board and the management selected
by the board to follow their own judgment in contravention to the will of the
shareholders.
The most important tangible contribution of stakeholder theory to corporate
law has been the constituency statute, the law in a majority of states (but not
Delaware).123 The constituency statute provides directors with the discretion to
take the interests of all stakeholders into account when making certain types of
decisions.124 Directors need not take other interests into account, and there is
generally no remedy for other stakeholders. These statutes are just a way of
insulating directors from claims that they failed to do enough for shareholders
when contemplating a tender offer, merger, or factory shutdown.
The real problem with stakeholder theory is that it is not, at least at present,
a real theory of firm governance. Stakeholder theory lacks a model for allocating
governance rights and responsibilities among the participants.125 The theory is
more in tune with the nexus of contracts approach, as it treats all the participants
in the firm as deserving of governance consideration. However, it fails to
develop a system for managing the different stakeholders within the firm.
Stakeholder theory does not, for example, argue that corporations are simply
contractual nexuses and thus should not exist as legal entities.126 Nor, more
122

For a discussion of those excesses, see William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side
of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002); Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time
Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 975 (2006).
123
Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State
Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 215 tbl.1 (2006) (finding
that thirty-one states have constituency statutes).
124
Some are limited to takeover/mergers, while others apply to all decisions. Millon,
supra note 119, at 11-12.
125
See Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, Putting a Stake in Stakeholder Theory, 88 J. BUS.
ETHICS 605, 611 (2009) (arguing that stakeholder theory fails to provide a system of
mechanisms for governance, other than “balancing” stakeholder concerns); Joseph
Heath, Business Ethics Without Stakeholders, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 533, 543 (2006)
(arguing that stakeholder theory creates “extraordinary agency risks” because of the
potential for conflicts).
126
Instead, many stakeholder theorists also ascribe to the entity view of the corporation,
which argues for treating the corporation as a state-created separate entity. Martin
Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm-from Nature to Function, 118 PENN
ST. L. REV. 1, 24 (2013) (“CSR scholars and stakeholder theorists have justified
consideration of broader stakeholder interests by characterizing the firm as not merely
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surprisingly, have stakeholder theorists sketched out a system whereby all
stakeholders can participate in firm governance. Instead, stakeholder theorists
have largely glommed on to the existing structure of corporate law, where
shareholders elect directors who appoint officers.127
III. THE FIRM AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
If we are to move beyond the current shareholder primacy model of
corporate governance, we need a theory of governance to ground our new
conception of the corporation. Economic theory is based, broadly, on the
principle of efficiency. The “theory of the firm” is a subdiscipline of economics
that focuses particularly on issues of organization and governance. The literature
on the theory of the firm asks: why do we have firms, rather than markets?128
This literature offers a sustained interdisciplinary inquiry into the nature of firms
and their legal representations.129 While much of the current work in other social
sciences, such a psychology and sociology, dovetails with economic theory and
provides additional insights into the basic economic models,130 the theory of the
firm offers a starting point for these inquiries and a basis upon which to build an
alternative academic narrative.

a legal fiction but rather as a moral organism with social and ethical responsibilities, or
built upon the view of the corporation as an entity existing in time and as a distinct
person.” (citations and quotations omitted)).
127
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 56, at 2113 (discussing examples); cf. Emily
Winston, Managerial Fixation and the Limitations of Shareholder Oversight,
HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3219871 (arguing for a
reduction of shareholder governance power through stakeholder reporting and
stakeholder-focused managerial compensation).
128
Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1757, 1757-65 (1989) (discussing various theories of the firm).
129
Eric W. Orts, Business Persons: A Legal Theory of the Firm (2013); Scott E. Masten,
A Legal Basis for the Firm, 4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 181 (1988).
130
See Matthew T. Bodie, The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law: Returning
to the Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1033, 1057 (2012) (noting that “the
different social science disciplines—economics, psychology, sociology,
anthropology—are increasingly borrowing from one another and bleeding into each
other's work”). See also THE FIRM AS A COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY:
RECONSTRUCTING TRUST IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (Charles Heckscher & Paul
S. Adler eds., 2006) [hereinafter COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY] (taking an
organizational behavior approach).
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A. Applying the Theory of the Firm to Corporate Governance
Research into the theory of the firm seeks to answer a fundamental question:
Why do we even have firms at all? Markets allocate resources based on the best
information available at the time.131 Firms, however, operate outside of this
market structure, standing like “lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of
buttermilk.”132 The law reflects this differentiation, as market transactions are
generally governed by contract, while firms are created as specific legal entities
with their own identity—partnerships, corporations, and LLCs, among others.
Firms are meant to operate outside the market. But why?
In early neoclassical economics, the theory of firm was quite rudimentary;
the firm was simply a black box that took in inputs and produced outputs.133 No
further dissection was undertaken. However, the black box did differentiate
between what was inside the firm and what was outside: employees and capital
assets were inside, while customers and suppliers were outside.134 Despite its
crude form, this conception of the firm was useful in early economic modeling
and retains that purpose even today.
An exploration of the internal workings and purpose of the firm begins with
the work of Ronald Coase.135 In an oft-quoted passage from his concise
masterpiece, The Nature of the Firm, Coase considered the firm-market
distinction:
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is
coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the
market. Within a firm these market transactions are eliminated,
and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange
transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-coordinator, who
directs production. It is clear that these are alternative methods of
coordinating production. Yet, having regard to the fact that, if
production is regulated by price movements, production could be
131

Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 520
(1945).
132
Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937) (quoting
D.H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 85 (1930)).
133
Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459, 1462 (2005) (“The
predominant model of microeconomics, neoclassical price theory, assumes simply that
the firm is a black box that maximizes profitability.”).
134
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms,
and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1631 (2001).
135
Coase, supra note 131.
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carried on without any organization at all, well we might ask,
why is there any organization?136
In answering this question, Coase turned to a theory of transaction costs.
Contracting through markets and using the price mechanism can be costly. For
certain transactions, Coase posited, it is cheaper to simply direct the production
to occur rather than contracting for it each time. The hierarchy of the firm allows
such transactions to be carried out by fiat, rather than through pricing,
negotiating, and drafting a contract for each transaction.137 In other words,
hierarchical governance within the firm was more efficient than market
transactions.
Coase’s theory of the firm relies heavily on the idea of the employment
relationship. The structural differentiation between firm and market is the
relationship between individual employees and the firm’s ownership or
management. The employment relationship is not based on individual spot
transactions, but rather an ongoing organizational relationship. As Coase
famously noted: “If a workman moves from department Y to department X, he
does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he was ordered
to do so.”138 The relationship between the firm and the employee is the primary
distinction between the firm and the market. It is the reason for the firm’s
existence.
This conclusion was cemented when Coase considered “whether the
concept of a firm which has been developed fits in with that existing in the real
world.”139 His answer? “We can best approach the question of what constitutes
a firm in practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of
‘master and servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’”140 He then quoted at length
from a treatise concerning the common law “control” test, which provides that
“[t]he master must have the right to control the servant’s work, either personally
or by another servant or agent.”141 He concluded: “We thus see that it is the fact
of direction which is the essence of the legal concept of ‘employer and

136

Id. at 388.
Id. at 390-92.
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Id. at 387.
139
Id. at 403.
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Id.
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Id. at 404.
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employee,’ just as it was in the economic concept which was developed
above.”142 For Coase, the employer-employee relationship defined the firm.143
Coase saw the nature of the firm as a hierarchical one in which managers
controlled the efforts of employees. But the relationship between firm and
employee need not be hierarchical. In an important response to Coase’s work,
Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz also focused on the relationship of
employees with other participants within the structure of the firm. 144 However,
they argued that Coase’s focus on control, authority, and direction was
misleading.145 They put it this way, memorably: “Telling an employee to type
this letter rather than to file that document is like my telling a grocer to sell me
this brand of tuna rather than that brand of bread.” Because employees are
generally hired and fired at will, neither the employer nor the employee is bound
to continue the relationship by any contractual obligations.146
Alchian and Demsetz instead took a more holistic approach, focusing on
the firm’s role in coordinating production in the midst of a variety of inputs.
Team production is what separated firms from markets. Alchian and Demsetz
defined team production as “production in which 1) several types of resources
are used and 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating
resource.”147 As a result, team production is used when the coordinated effort
increased productivity, after factoring out the costs associated with monitoring
and disciplining the team.148
The lack of “separable outputs” is the key problem that the firm is designed
to manage. When capital providers and workers join together to carry on a
business, it is difficult to assess the relative importance or value of the individual
142

Id.
See Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 265, 296-97 (1998).
144
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) (“When a lumber mill employs
a cabinetmaker, cooperation between specialists is achieved within a firm, and when a
cabinetmaker purchases wood from a lumberman, the cooperation takes place across
markets (or between firms).”).
145
Id. (“To speak of managing, directing, or assigning workers to various tasks is a
deceptive way of noting that the employer continually is involved in renegotiation of
contracts on terms that must be acceptable to both parties.”).
146
Id. (“Long-term contracts between employer and employee are not the essence of
the organization we call a firm.”).
147
Id. at 779.
148
Id. at 780.
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contributions to that business in an easily measurable and ongoing formula.
Firms allow these contributors to work together, sell their joint product, and then
use the firm to manage both responsibilities and spoils. Alchian and Demsetz
argued that a specialized, independent monitor was likely the best way of
manage these issues.149 That central monitor—the recipient of the residual
profits—would be the firm itself: a legal “person” who contracts for all other
team inputs.150 The legal entity—such as the corporation—serves the role of
coordinator.
The Alchian and Demsetz joint-production model includes employees as
well as investors within the definition of the firm. The purpose of the AlchianDemsetz firm is to manage labor and capital through the coordination of team
production. Although they contribute capital, outside shareholders are relegated
to the outer circles of power, as Alchian & Demsetz express skepticism about
their ability to perform the monitoring function. They ask:
In sum, is it the case that the stockholder-investor relationship is
one emanating from the division of ownership among several
people, or is it that the collection of investment funds from people
of various anticipations is the underlying factor? If the latter, why
should any of them be thought of as the owners in whom voting
rights, whatever they may signify or however exercisable, should
reside in order to enhance efficiency? Why voting rights in any
of the outside, participating investors?151
As the theory of the firm literature continued to develop, the critical
question remained why some economic activities take place in markets and
others take place within firms. The transaction-costs model identifies the types
of contractual difficulties which are likely to lead to firm governance rather than
market solutions.152 In situations where contributions and compensation can be
harder to define, the parties will be left with incomplete contracts that require a
149

Id. at 782-83.
Alchian and Demsetz set forth the following characteristics of the firm: (a) joint
input production, (b) several input owners, (c) one party is common to all the contracts
of the joint inputs, (d) who has the rights to renegotiate any input’s contract
independently of contracts with the other input owners, (e) who holds the residual claim,
and (f) who has the right to sell his central contractual residual status. Id. at 783.
151
Id. at 789 n.14.
152
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); Jeffrey T. Macher & Barak D.
Richman, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the
Social Sciences, 10 BUS. & POL. 1 (2008) (discussing transaction costs approach).
150

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441307

2020]

THE CORPORATION REBORN

33

governance structure to prevent opportunism.153 This opportunism will be
particularly problematic where one or both of the parties must invest significant
resources in assets specific to the particular firm, project, or transaction.154 This
asset specificity makes the parties susceptible to hold-ups from their contractual
partners in the absence of a system of governance. Firms can be useful in
providing the structures that deter opportunism.155
The “property rights” theory of the firm, developed in a series of articles by
Sanford Grossman, Oliver Hart, and John Moore, argues that firms are necessary
as a repository of property rights for assets used in joint production.156 By
owning the property outright, the firm prevents the problem of the commons (in
which no one holds property rights over valuable assets) as well as the problem
of the anticommons (in which property rights are divvied up among too many
disparate actors). The Grossman-Hart-Moore model dictates that those who
contribute the most valuable and most asset-specific property to the joint
enterprise should control the firm.157 They are not only most necessary to the
firm’s success; they are also the most vulnerable to hold-up problems as the joint
enterprise moves forward in time.
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Oliver E. Williamson, Why Law, Economics, and Organization?, 1 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. 369, 373 (2005) (“Governance problems are posed when incomplete contracts (to
include unforeseen contingencies) are combined with opportunism.”).
154
George S. Geis, The Space Between Markets and Hierarchies, 95 VA. L. REV. 99,
153 (2009) (“Oliver Williamson has significantly expanded upon Coase's initial insight
by discussing the importance of bundling relationship-specific assets into a firm to
avoid counterparty opportunism, and, more generally, by showing how a proper
conception of transaction costs should include both the direct costs of managing
relationships and the opportunity costs of suboptimal governance decisions.”).
155
See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 47-48 (1996);
WILLIAMSON, supra note 152, at 114-15.
156
See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995);
Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of
Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John
Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988);
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 1119 (1990).
157
D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1399, 1404-05 (2002) (“The central insight of the property rights theory of the
firm is that an appropriate allocation of ownership rights over the assets of a firm
reduces the likelihood that one party will unfairly take advantage of the other
participants within the firm.”)
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The “access” model defines a firm “both in terms of unique assets (which
may be physical or human) and in terms of the people who have access to these
assets.”158 Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales define access as “the ability to
use, or work with, a critical resource.”159 As Rajan and Zingales make clear,
“[t]he agent who is given privileged access to the resource gets no new residual
rights of control. All she gets is the opportunity to specialize her human capital
to the resource and make herself valuable.”160 Combined with her right to leave
the firm, access gives the employee the ability to “create a critical resource that
she controls: her specialized human capital.”161 Control over this critical
resource is a source of power. Gordon Smith has further developed this “critical
resource” theory of the firm in outlining a theory of fiduciary duties that are
responsible to vulnerabilities created by critical resources.162
Employees’ contributions to the firm—often described as “human
capital”—can be characterized as assets of both the firm and the employee.
Some types of human capital are portable, such as education or general skills,
but other types are specific to the firm and cannot be taken by the employee
elsewhere. To the extent an employee has invested in firm-specific human
capital, she is subject to opportunistic behavior, since she cannot plausibly
threaten to use that capital at a rival firm. One aspect of this capital—
knowledge—has served as the basis for a new set of approaches to the firm.163
Knowledge-based theories focus on the need to produce, distribute, and
ultimately retain valuable knowledge-based assets within the firm.164 Choices

158

Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 387, 390 (1998).
159
Id. at 388.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Smith, supra note 156, at 1404 (“[T]the critical resource theory reveals that the
beneficiary’s vulnerability emanates from an inability to protect against opportunism
by the fiduciary with respect to the critical resource.”).
163
See Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions, and
Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV.
1123 (2007); Sarah Kaplan et al., Knowledge-Based Theories of the Firm: A Review
and Extension, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 242 (2002). See also Katherine V.W. Stone,
Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing
Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721 (2002) (discussing legal conceptions that govern the
ownership of human capital within the workplace).
164
Gorga & Michael Halberstam, supra note 162, at 1137 (criticizing the property rights
theory for failing to account for the importance of employees as assets).
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between centralized and multi-divisional organizational structures,165 or
between covenants not to compete and employee stock options,166 are made to
manage the control of knowledge within the firm. Along the same lines, a
capability-based theory of the firm focuses on employees’ firm-specific
knowledge and learning that can be translated into joint production.167 Another
perspective on the firm, this time from organizational theory, sees the firm as a
“collaborative community” in which employees work together toward common
goals.168
Looking over the trajectory of the theory of the firm, we see that the primary
concern has been over the shape and internal organization for these entities that
operate outside of the standard market relationships. And the theories of the firm
all seem to acknowledge the important role of workers within the firm. Going
back to Coase, the firm was designed to manage the relationship between those
who started or managed the business and those who worked for the business.
The work of the business was best managed internally, rather than through
external markets. And the firm itself was made up of those who worked for the
firm, along with those who “managed” the firm—also workers—and those who
“owned” the firm through financial assets.
B. The Legal Construction of Firm Governance
Because the firm is the primary organizational engine of economic activity
and growth, the internal governance of the firm takes on supreme importance.
The corporate form, and its systematic exclusion of employees from governance,
is not endemic to economic organization. Partnerships, for example, were the
original legal structure for organizing a group of people into a firm. Unlike
corporations, partnerships have never required an explicit grant of authority
from the government to operate.169 In fact, courts can determine that a group of
165

Id. at 1173-83.
Id. at 1183-92. Cf. Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and Boundaries of
Technology Intensive Firms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1686-88 (2009) (discussing the
role of covenants not to compete in managing innovation within the firm).
167
Thomas McInerney, Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance, 2004 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 135, 139.
168
See Paul S. Adler & Charles Heckscher, Towards Collaborative Community, in
COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY, supra note 129, at 11, 13.
169
See D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 53
(2004) (“[N]o formalities are required to form a partnership.”); Christine Hurt,
Partnership Lost, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 491, 497 (2019) (“Partnerships existed at
166
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people had been operating as a partnership, even if they had never declared
themselves to be partners or considered themselves to be within a partnership.170
Instead, the test is whether the parties had formed “an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.”171 There are numerous
examples of situations where people working together on the assumption that
the worker was an employee turned out to be partners under the law.172
Under the default rules of a partnership, all participants have equal voting
rights and equal rights to vote on partnership matters.173 The control rights in a
partnership extend even to ordinary, everyday matters of the business.174 Of
course, “one partner, one vote” is only the default rule. Partners who
contemplate varying levels of input and interest will generally construct a
partnership agreement that allocates votes as well as shares of the residual profits
according to mutual agreement.175 Partners are free to divvy up voting power
according to contributions, seniority, experience, involvement, and other factors
relevant to governance. The default rules are a bit more structured for the limited
partnership, the limited liability partnership, and the limited liability company.
These organizations envision participants with stakes in the residual who do not
participate in management. For example, limited partnerships must make clear
who the managerial partners are, and who the limited partners are.176 Limited
liability companies have what is known as “chameleon” management: “the firm
common law in England and in the United States before partnership acts were
promulgated in the 1800s.”).
170
See, e.g., Bass v. Bass, 814 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tenn. 1991) (holding that “it is not
essential that the parties actually intend to become partners.”).
171
Unif. P’ship Act § 6(1), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995); Rev. Unif. P’ship Act § 202(a)
(amended 1997).
172
See, e.g., Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 891 (Tex. 2009); Holmes v. Lerner, 74
Cal. App. 4th 442 (1999); Smith v. Redd, 593 So. 2d 989, 991 (Miss. 1991);
173
Unif. P’ship Act § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995); Rev. Unif. P’ship Act § 401(f)
(amended 1997).
174
See Unif. P’ship Act § 18(h), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995); Rev. Unif. P’ship Act § 401(j)
(amended 1997).
175
See, e.g., Day v. Sidley & Austin, 394 F. Supp. 986, 992 (D.D.C. 1975) (discussing
how “statutory rules governing the rights and duties of the partners are ‘subject to any
agreement between them.”’).
176
See Rev. Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act § 303 (amended 1985), 6A U.L.A. 144-45 (1995).
However, under the original Uniform Limited Partnership Act, limited partners may be
subject to liability as managing partners if they participate in the governance. Unif. Ltd.
P’ship Act § 7 (1916), 6A U.L.A. 336 (1995) (“A limited partner shall not become liable
as a general partner unless ... he takes part in the control of the business.”).
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can choose either direct partnership-type control by the members or centralized
control by managers that is closer to, but not as rigid as, the limited partnership
format.”177 Participants in these enterprises have substantial flexibility in
arranging the division of ownership and control rights.
The corporation, in contrast, represents a shareholder-oriented governance
structure—one that leaves out other participants. In smaller corporations known
as closely-held corporations, the same basic corporate structure is used, but these
businesses must adapt the corporate form’s rigidity for their purposes.178 Many
closely-held companies have different classes of shares as a method of allocating
control among different groups of shareholders.179 In addition, shareholders may
agree to certain voting arrangements, such as the pooling of votes into a voting
trust or an agreement to vote together.180 These voting arrangements consolidate
a group of disparate shareholders into a majority and provide protection to
minority shareholders over certain critical matters.181 Corporate law can also
protect minority shareholders against undue oppression through specificallytailored equitable relief. Such oppression often relates to the ability of minority
shareholders to partake in other aspects of the corporate pie—specifically,
employment.182 Even if shareholders are all sharing equally in the profits, the
minority oppression doctrine may still order the majority shareholders to
177

Larry E. Ribstein, The Evolving Partnership, 26 J. CORP. L. 819, 843 (2001).
See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511
(Mass. 1975) (defining closely held corporations as having “(1) a small number of
stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority
stockholder participation in the management, direction and operations of the
corporation.”).
179
Preferred stock is particularly common in start-up corporations. Venture capital
investors prefer to invest with preferred stock, which converts into common stock with
multiple voting shares if certain triggers are reached. William W. Bratton, Venture
Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV.
891, 892 (2002) (noting that “[c]onvertible preferred stock is the dominant financial
contract in the venture capital market.”).
180
See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 486-96 (2000).
181
Perhaps the most famous example of such a trust involves the Ringling family of
circus fame. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441, 447 (Del. 1947)
(upholding such a trust).
182
See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976)
(finding “no legitimate business purpose” to the majority’s decision to suspend a
minority shareholder’s salary, fail to reelect him as a director, and fail to appoint him
as an officer); Leslie v. Boston Software Collaborative, Inc., 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 379
(Mass. Super. Ct. 2002) (minority shareholder terminated from his position as treasurer
by majority shareholders).
178
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approve a dividend or to provide employment opportunities within the company
for minority shareholders.183
This divergence between the cookie-cutter structure of corporation
governance and the more tailored approaches of other systems suggests that
corporations could reconsider their lockstep approach. And in fact, recent
developments in shareholding structures illustrate a breakdown in the one-share,
one-vote consensus model. Companies such as Facebook, Google, and Snap
have stock structures that grant the company founders special control rights
beyond their common stock holdings.184 Preferred stock is also used to provide
control rights in certain circumstances, such as the failure to make a payment or
the approach of the company’s dissolution.185 Companies are getting creative in
order to accommodate the special circumstances of their particular business
firm.186
More broadly, corporate law needs to dig deeper into the theory of the firm.
It needs to reexamine the premise that corporate governance is only about
shareholders, directors, and officers. In particular, corporate law policymakers
and theorists need to look at all of the corporation’s stakeholders and determine
if governance rights are appropriate as a way of managing their preferences.
Prior to recent proposed legislation,187 the U.S. corporate law community has
not seriously entertained any significant changes to the corporate franchise.
Even team-production proponents have only prodded the board to directors to
183

For a further discussion of the protection of minority shareholders vis-à-vis the
protection of political minorities, see Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and
Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119 (2003).
184
Lund, supra note 8, at 694.
185
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW & ECONOMICS 66-67 (2002)
(“[P]referred stock may have a preference over common stock with respect to dividends
and/or liquidation”). Preferred shares have often been ignored in the debate about
shareholder wealth maximization, with the assumption that the shareholders in question
are the common stock holders. See id. at 66 (noting that preferred stock is “an odd beast,
neither wholly fish nor wholly fowl”); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A
Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815, 1820 (2013) (“Preferred stock sits
on a fault line between two great private law paradigms, corporate law and contract law.
It is neither one nor the other; rather, it draws on both.”).
186
See Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 773 (“[B]ecause the impact of a given
governance structure on control costs is firm-specific, there is no particular governance
structure that can be described as intrinsically good, bad, welfare enhancing, or
inefficient.”).
187
See, e.g., Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018); Reward Work
Act, S. 2605, 115th Cong. (2018).
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consider the interests of stakeholders.188 With the power structures already in
place, it makes little sense to imagine a stakeholder-rights theory without any
positive governance power for stakeholders. As former Delaware Supreme
Court Chief Justice Leo Strine has emphasized:
Under the DGCL [Delaware General Corporate Law] only
stockholders have the right to vote for directors; approve
certificate amendments; amend the bylaws; approve certain other
transactions, such as mergers, and certain asset sales and leases;
and enforce the DGCL’s terms and hold directors accountable for
honoring their fiduciary duties. In the corporate republic, no
constituency other than stockholders is given any power.189
Voting rights are the only way to provide a real voice to preferences within the
corporation’s governance structure.190
C. A Shared Governance Model of the Firm
1. Participation in Joint Production
Corporations exist to facilitate economic production.191 The corporate form
is not the same thing as a business; an actual business consists of ideas,
relationships, economic activity, and legal rights. The corporate form is part of
this mix.192 The corporation is a legal fiction that creates rights and duties; the

188

Hayden & Bodie, supra note 56.
Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware
General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 763-66 (2015); see also Hon.
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That for-Profit Corporations
Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 135-36 (2012) (“[T]he continued failure of
our societies to be clear-eyed about the role of the for-profit corporation endangers the
public interest.”).
190
Smith, supra note 156, at 1458 (contemplating that “the key residual ownership right
in the corporation is the right to elect directors”).
191
RIBSTEIN, supra note 58, at 4 (“The corporation undeniably has driven business
growth in the United States since the Industrial Revolution.”).
192
William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under
Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1521 (1982) (suggesting that “the most useful way to
analyze the modern business enterprise is to interpret the terms of the economic
arrangements of a firm (partnership, corporation, cooperative) and the terms of the
related economic arrangements that should not be analyzed separately from the firm
189
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business firm is the ongoing social phenomenon that is the business. The legal
part of the business equation is meant to facilitate the social and economic
phenomenon.
The economic distribution of the responsibilities for production, as well as
the distribution of the fruits of production, will ultimately rest in the hands of
those with organizational power. Much of the debate in corporate law over the
last forty years—perhaps even the last century—has concerned the distribution
of corporate power between the board, the officers, and the shareholders.193
Shareholder advocates have pushed for corporate law reforms that provide more
direct power to stockholders.194 Management and stakeholder advocates have
argued that boards need more insulation from shareholders and less scrutiny,
even if their ultimate aims remain shareholder wealth maximization.195 In this
second group, there is a subset of advocates who argue that stakeholders such as
employees, creditors, consumers, and communities deserve some protection
within the process.196 But stakeholder supporters generally provide directors
with the freedom to merely consider all stakeholder interests, rather than
granting voting power to these stakeholders.197
If the firm is designed to help manage a system of joint production, then the
governance of the firm should include those who participate in the joint
production. The distinction between markets and firms is this distinction
between the use of straightforward contracts to manage relationships and the
need for governance mechanisms to manage relationships. 198 Firms involve the
complexities of ongoing joint production between participants who cannot
reduce their interactions simply to contractual performance metrics. Instead, the
(distributorship, loan agreement, employment contracts) as a series of bargains subject
to constraints and made in contemplation of a long-term relationship”).
193
For the beginnings of the debate over the separation of ownership and control, see
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932). See also Jensen & Meckling, supra note 57 (discussing the problem
of agency costs in light of the separation of ownership and control).
194
See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 3.
195
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 550; Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The
Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733, 754 (2007); Lynn A. Stout, The
Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 804-05 (2007).
196
See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 313.
197
Hayden & Bodie, supra note 56, at 2113 (discussing the “strange turn” against
stakeholder board representation).
198
See Bengt Holmstrom, The Firm as a Subeconomy, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 74, 80
(1999) (“When contracts are incomplete in the sense that they cannot incorporate all
future contracting opportunities, governance becomes consequential.”).
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participants create another entity—the firm—to serve as the locus of their
production and to structure both the inputs required by the participants and to
divvy up the outputs among them.
Shareholders and employees are invested in the firm in such a way that they
need firm governance to protect against opportunism. When it comes to their
contractual vulnerability, shareholders are indeed situated differently from other
capital providers (such as creditors).199 Shareholders invest their money into the
firm with no ability to withdraw it and subject to uncertain payoffs, largely at
the discretion of management.200 Employees are also firm investors. They have
invested their labor, reputations, and firm-specific individual capital in the firm
and cannot not pull these investments out.201 Under the law, they are
compensated on a more regular basis, and with less discretion, than
shareholders.202 However, they still operate within the firm, as opposed to
suppliers and outside contractors who provide their services through markets.203
199

See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 68-69; Benjamin Means, A
Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161,
1197 (2010) (discussing the problem of “shareholder oppression” and vulnerability, and
the inability of contracts to unequivocally protect such shareholders).
200
See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for
Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 392 (2003)
(citing the importance of “resource commitment” or capital lock-in as a critical reason
for the success of the corporation as a private enterprise).
201
See Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283,
302 (1998) (noting that firm-specific skills “make a worker more valuable to her present
employer, but also make her more vulnerable to a firm’s opportunistic behavior”);
Andrew Keay, Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has It Got What It Takes?, 9
RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 249, 368 (2010).
202
As late as the nineteenth century, employees worked for terms as long as a year and
were not entitled to any contractual payment if they left before the end. See, e.g., Stark
v. Parker, 19 Mass. 267, 292-94 (1824) (denying any contractual recovery for an
employee who left after nine months of a twelve-month job); Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H.
481, 491-92 (1834) (denying contractual recovery but allowing for recovery under
restitution). Now, however, wage and hour laws require payment for time worked and
periodic payments made to the employee. See generally Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(2012)).
203
Scholars have made a case for consumer governance rights in a limited set of
circumstances. See HANSMANN, supra note 82, at 149-223 (discussing specific
instances of customer-owned enterprises); David G. Yosifon, The Consumer Interest in
Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 253 (2009) [hereinafter Yosifon, Consumer
Interest] (arguing that consumers are inadequately represented in corporate
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The theory of the firm supports a governance model that includes
employees. Theory of the firm scholars have long appreciated the importance of
the employee to our conception of the firm.204 Ronald Coase looked to the
relationship between employer and employee to demonstrate empirical support
for his theory of the firm.205 Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz argued that the
importance of the firm (as separate from the market) stems from the need to
coordinate production from a variety of inputs.206 Team production is used—
and firms replace markets—when the coordinated effort increases productivity,
after factoring out the costs associated with monitoring and disciplining the

governance); David G. Yosifon, Consumer Lock-in and the Theory of the Firm, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1429, 1430 (2012) [hereinafter Yosifon, Lock-in] (concluding that
“a departure from the shareholder wealth maximization norm and an embrace of a
multi-stakeholder corporate governance regime may be necessary to overcome agency
problems associated with consumer lock-in”).
204
See generally Coase, supra note 131, at 401-05.
205
See id. at 403 (“We can best approach the question of what constitutes a firm in
practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of ‘master and
servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’”).
206
See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 143, at 778 (describing the firm as a “centralized
contractual agent in a team production process”).
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team.207 Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout relied on this notion of team production
in developing their stakeholder-based theory.208
By adding employees to the governance mix, we are not opening it up to all
stakeholders. The non-separable inputs within team production really belong to
employees and shareholders.209 Shareholders provide capital that is taken within
the firm and turned into discretionary funds.210 Employees work together under
the aegis of the firm to produce goods or services in a manner that generally
cannot be separated out to assign specific values.211 Other participants are not
integrated into the team production process, and, thus, do not need to work
within the firm.212 Creditors provide money on fixed terms.213 Suppliers and
independent contractors provide specific services outside of the firm’s scope.
Consumers purchase the goods or services after the production process is
complete.214 And the surrounding community regulates the firm as it does all
other individuals and organizations within its jurisdiction. If we say that all of
these participants are engaged in the production process, it proves too much—
then all participants in the market would be engaged in commerce with one
another. Employees and shareholders are part of that team production process in
a way that stakeholders outside the firm are not.215
207

Id. at 780.
See Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 275 (analyzing the “team production problem”
arising “when a number of individuals must invest firm-specific resources to produce a
nonseparable output”).
209
See id. at 249 (“If the team members’ investments are firm-specific . . . and if output
from the enterprise is nonseparable, . . . serious problems can arise in determining how
any economic surpluses generated by team production . . . should be divided.”).
210
See id. at 277 (“Providers of financial capital—shareholders and even, potentially,
some creditors—are, by this agreement, just as ‘stuck’ in the firm as are providers of
specialized human capital.”).
211
Id. at 261.
212
See id. at 269 (arguing that “employees, shareholders, and executives” are the main
players on the corporate “team”).
213
But cf. Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical
Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1652-55 (2002) (arguing that “[t]here is
no doubt that creditors who loan money to publicly held corporations thereby make a
team-specific investment” but that they are “less vulnerable to opportunism when
trading with publicly held corporations” when compared to other team members).
214
See Yosifon, Consumer Interest, supra note 202, at 259 (discussing the cabined role
of some consumers in the transacting process).
215
Some stakeholder theorists have advocated specifically for employee governance
rights. GREENFIELD, supra note 29, at 112 (advocating for a special role for employees
in corporate law, including the possibility of board representation); Brett H. McDonnell,
208
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Concern for the fates of other stakeholders is understandable and may, in
some circumstances, warrant a species of governance protection. Creditors, for
example, may receive specific protections when the company is close to
bankruptcy as a way of mitigating their particular vulnerabilities in such
situations.216 Certain consumers may have the type of long-term, invested
interests, such that some governance and/or ownership rights may make
sense.217 In the main, however, government regulation will be the most
straightforward way of managing issues that arise and are not amenable to
contractual resolution. Creditors have statutory rights within bankruptcy.218
Consumer protection laws can place mandatory terms or disclosure requirements

Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate Governance, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
429, 430–31 (2011) (evaluating “a number of possible strategies for creating a role for
employees in corporate governance”); see also Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy,
or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334, 334
(2008) (promoting employee primacy); Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the
Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing A Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced
Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991); Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the
American Corporate Governance Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 97 (2000).
Others have noted that employees have a stronger or the strongest case among
stakeholders for participation in governance. Millon, supra note 119, at 14 (noting that
“[t]he most compelling theoretical arguments for nonshareholder protection have
focused on employees,” and that “the relative inadequacy of bargaining power and other
disadvantages may more seriously impede bargained-for protection for employees than
for other nonshareholder groups”).
216
See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as Means to an
End, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255, 296 (2015) (“[C]ourts should revert to their traditional
focus on policing against the bargaining failures that can occur when investors use
directors to address the incomplete contracting challenges that are replete in corporate
finance.”); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of
Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115, 119 (2009)
[hereinafter Tung, Leverage] (arguing that “bank creditors and other private lenders
often enjoy significant oversight and influence over managerial decisions”). For a
discussion of the possible expansion of fiduciary duties to creditors, see Frederick Tung,
The New Death of Contract: Creeping Corporate Fiduciary Duties for Creditors, 57
EMORY L.J. 809, 814-15 (2008) [hereinafter Tung, Fiduciary Duties].
217
See HANSMANN, supra note 82, at 149-68 (discussing consumer ownership);
Yosifon, Lock-In, supra note 202, at 1449-59 (discussing types of lock-in situations).
218
See Tung, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 215, at 842 (“By the time the firm is in
distress, its creditors will enjoy differing rights (including payment and priority rights),
differing stakes in the continuation of the borrower firm, and differing contract
protections.”).
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on firms.219 Environmental protections address externalities by imposing costs
on firms (and individuals) for creating those externalities.220 But corporate
governance, like all firm governance, should be addressed to solving problems
that arise within the firm structure—problems related to team production.221
Employees and shareholders are the stakeholders engaged in the process of team
production within the firm.222
2.

Information within the Firm

A system of shared governance better reflects the flow of information within
the firm. Information has always been the strange paradox at the heart of
corporate law theory. Shareholders delegate governance power to management
because they do not have the time or resources to get the information necessary
to make independent governance decisions. And yet shareholder primacy asks
shareholders to vote with sufficient knowledge and understanding to curb
agency costs and direct the corporation efficiently. This paradox has come into
219

Cf. Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, the
Institutionalization of Consumerism, and Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1147, 1169 (2010) (“Despite the many state and federal statutes that have been
enacted in the last forty years to regulate consumer transactions, the underlying contract
between the company and the consumer remains crucial in determining the rights and
liabilities of the parties.”).
220
Individual shareholders at individual companies can no doubt use corporate law and
governance to advance environmental concerns. See Sarah E. Light, The Law of the
Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 140 (2019) (arguing that
“the law governing the corporation throughout its life cycle—corporate law, securities
regulation, antitrust law, and bankruptcy law—should be understood as a fundamental
part of environmental law”). For a discussion of the use of voting power to provide
stakeholders with influence in benefit corporations, see Brett H. McDonnell, From Duty
and Disclosure to Power and Participation in Social Enterprise, 70 ALA. L. REV. 77,
124 (2018).
221
See Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 250 (“[P]ublic corporation law can offer a
second-best solution to team production problems because it allows rational individuals
who hope to profit from team production to overcome shirking and rent-seeking by
opting into an internal governance structure we call the ‘mediating hierarchy.’”).
222
Note that a shared governance structure for the firm would align with William
Bratton’s description of the corporate purpose: “corporate law should facilitate
corporate attempts to maximize productive output (and hence wealth) in a competitive
economy, encouraging long-term investment at the lowest cost of capital, subject to
exterior regulations that control externalities.” William W. Bratton, Framing a Purpose
for Corporate Law, 39 J. CORP. L. 713, 723-24 (2014).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441307

46

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

fuller view of late, as theorists raise powerful concerns about the “competence
costs” of principal governance223 and the voting rights of passive funds.224
Employees have information about the firm that they obtain through their
everyday experience with the company without additional cost. Yet they have
no formal governance mechanisms for using this information to help guide the
company. The overwhelming majority of private sector employees are not
represented by a union.225 Even if employees are represented by a union, that
union has no formal right to bargain with the company over issues of managerial
prerogative, such as new product lines, marketing, acquisitions, or the
composition of the board.226 The formal mechanism for employee input is the
proverbial suggestion box.
In the 1980s and 1990s, both academic and popular business literature
explored ways in which firms could better process and utilize information held
by employees.227 The success of Japanese businesses led many to investigate
ways in which Japanese firms better integrated employee decisionmaking.228
Internal systems involving “quality circles” and “quality improvement teams”
were heralded as a way of drawing employee know-how into daily operations.229
223

Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 785-90.
Lund, supra note 6, at 497.
225
Union Member Summary, BUREAU L. STAT. (Jan. 18, 2019),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (finding that 6.4% of private-sector
employees are unionized).
226
Employers only need to bargain about terms and conditions of employment; they
need not discuss areas within the “core of entrepreneurial control.” NLRB v. Wooster
Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (discussing the mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining); SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MATTHEW T. BODIE,
LABOR LAW 134-39 (2016).
227
For a sampling of the legal academic literature—much of it involving employee
ownership—see MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL (1995); THE NEW
RELATIONSHIP: HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION (Margaret M. Blair
& Thomas A. Kochan eds., 2000); JOSEPH R. BLASI, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP:
REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF? (1988); HANSMANN, supra note 82, at 66-119; PAUL WEILER,
GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE (1990); Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership,
67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 159, 160 (1991).
228
See, e.g., ROBERT E. COLE, WORK, MOBILITY, AND PARTICIPATION: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMERICAN AND JAPANESE INDUSTRY (1980); Jon Gertner,
From 0 to 60 to World Domination, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2007 (Magazine), at 34.
229
See, e.g., JOSEPH M. JURAN, QUALITY BY DESIGN (1992); DAVID I. LEVINE,
REINVENTING THE WORKPLACE: HOW BUSINESS AND EMPLOYEES CAN BOTH WIN
(1995); PAUL LILLRANK & NORIAKI KANO, CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT: QUALITY
224
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Such methods stood in opposition to hierarchical management structures and the
Taylorist method of production, which held that managers generated the
information and disseminated it down the ladder.230 Although many of these
structures are in use today,231 they almost always do not extend power to the
higher reaches of the corporation, where true power sits.
This gap between knowledge on the employees’ part and power on the
shareholders’ part seems inefficient. Shareholders and employees could work
together to pool their information and their power to police decisions of
management. To take just one example: the process of carrying out a corporate
combination, such as a merger or sale of substantially all assets, generally
follows a prescribed pattern. After some set of the top corporate officers agree
to the deal, the companies must secretly and expeditiously conduct due diligence
using high-level management and outside consultants. If this hastily-conducted
due diligence uncovers no problems, the boards approve the combination and
announce the deal to the public and shareholders. The shareholders generally
have a couple months to digest the proxy materials and media reports before
they vote to approve or quash the merger. If the combination receives
shareholder and regulatory approval, the combination ultimately goes into
effect.232 There are strategic reasons for the structure of this process: secrecy
prevents poaching and keeps failed negotiations under the rug.233 While this
secrecy serves a purpose, it also narrowly restricts both the information and the
perspectives that can be brought to bear. As a result, corporate combinations are
extremely top-down affairs. From start to finish, the typical corporate
combination is hampered by the absence of critical information. Employees are
a natural fit to help overcome this information deficit—they have specialized

CONTROL CIRCLES IN JAPANESE INDUSTRY (1989); Erin White, How a Company Made
Everyone a Team Player, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2007, at B1.
230
See Katherine V.W. Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing
Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 143-46 (1988)
(discussing Taylorism in the workplace).
231
New managerial methodologies providing for participatory management and
employee voice are increasingly popular around the globe. See, e.g., LALOUX, supra
note 15; ROBERTSON, supra note 15.
232
For a discussion of this phenomenon in the context of the AOL-Time Warner merger,
see Bodie, supra note 121.
233
See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234-35 (1988) (discussing the
importance of keeping merger negotiations secret).
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information from the shop floor that is often undervalued by expensive corporate
consultants.234
Employees also have information about the agency costs associated with
managerial opportunism—information that shareholders are not likely to have.
While directors may be expected to police such opportunism, there are a variety
of reasons to doubt their effectiveness. First, the directors themselves may be in
on the deal; the firm may decide to award bonuses to directors as well as
managers.235 Second, directors may already feel beholden to managers. Toplevel executives have significant power over the board nomination and
reelection process236 as well as the directorial compensation process.237 Personal
ties help cement the feelings of loyalty and friendship.238 Third, directors are
part-timers; they themselves do not have the same quantity and depth of
information that employees have. Boards may end up trusting that investment
bankers, compensation consultants, and other advisors have dealt with the
compensation issue sufficiently, when in fact these advisors have their own set
of conflicts.239

234

See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL
DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY 231-36 (1984) (discussing the practice of
“flexible specialization” on the shop floor). See also MIKE ROSE, THE MIND AT WORK:
VALUING THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE AMERICAN WORKER xxxiv (2004) (discussing the
various intelligences of different types of workers).
235
See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 331-33 (Del. Ch. 1997) (discussing the issues
surrounding a stock option grant to directors).
236
LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 25-27 (2004).
237
Id. at 27-31 (discussing how top-level managers can financially reward directors).
238
Brian G.M. Main, Charles A. O’Reilly III & James Wade, The CEO, the Board of
Directors, and Executive Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 4
INDUS. & CORP CHANGE 292 (1995).
239
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 235, at 37-39. See also In re Walt Disney
Shareholders’ Litigation, 907 A.2d 693, 704-11 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 27 (Del.
2006) (discussing the process through which Michael Ovitz was hired by Walt Disney
in 1995). Despite denying the duties of care and good faith challenge against the Ovitz
hiring, Chancellor Chandler acknowledged that “the compensation committee met for
one hour” to discuss the terms of Michael Ovitz’s compensation along with the
compensation packages for various Disney employees, 121 stock option grants, toplevel executive Robert Iger’s employment agreement, and board member and
compensation committee chair Irwin Russell's $250,000 compensation for negotiating
the Ovitz deal. Id. at 708 (emphasis in the original).
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Although their interests may diverge in other contexts, employees are
ideally situated to join with shareholders in an effort to police management.
Indeed, this already appears to be taking place. Labor unions, for example, have
become much more involved in traditional corporate governance activism.240 In
the 1980s, unions were generally antagonistic to shareholder concerns and
supported anti-takeover tactics such as constituency statutes.241 However,
unions and union-associated pension funds have joined the side of shareholders
in pushing through shareholder-friendly corporate governance measures.242
Pension fund managers have been at the forefront in governance efforts to
strengthen shareholder voting rights,243 rein in the power of the CEO,244 and
fight fraud and abuse by insiders.245 These measures suggest an ongoing role for
union activism: an alliance with shareholders in an effort to maximize long-term
growth for shareholders and other stakeholders. Employee board representation
would provide a conduit for this kind of agency-costs information for the 93
percent of private-sector employees who are not represented by a union.246
Whether unionized or not, employees have an interest in working with
shareholders to prevent executives from taking advantage of the other
stakeholders in the company.
Unlike employees, consumers, suppliers, creditors, and other stakeholders
all sit outside the firm and are less likely to have the breadth and depth of
understanding that employees have. These stakeholders will have some slice of
information about the firm by dint of their market relationships, and in certain
circumstances those relationships may justify limited governance input or even
governance rights.247 However, as a matter of course, employees are much more

240

See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1998).
241
Id. at 1036.
242
Id. at 1045. (“The amazing thing about these union-sponsored shareholder proposals
is how ordinary they are, from the perspective of any institutional investor.”). See
generally DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER:
LABOR’S LAST BEST WEAPON (2018).
243
WEBBER, supra note 241, at 45-78.
244
Id. at 111-51.
245
Id. at 164-80.
246
Union Member Summary, BUREAU L. STAT. (Jan. 18, 2019),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (finding that 6.4% of private-sector
employees are unionized).
247
For a discussion of various ownership structures for different types of firms, see
HANSMANN, supra note 82.
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likely to hold information that would usefully contribute to the governance
process and be in a position to share it.
The theory of the firm separates those who engage in the ongoing business
of the firm from those who contract with the firm from the outside. Those inside
the corporation should have their preferences captured through more direct
governance mechanisms such as voting, those outside through processes like
contract or regulation. Under this understanding of the firm, employees are the
classic insiders, a conclusion that’s only reinforced by more recent work on the
generation and flow of information within firms. The economic theory of the
firm, then, provides a powerful argument for extending the corporate franchise
to employees.
IV. DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION AND SHARED GOVERNANCE
When it comes to the corporate franchise, the theory of the firm provides a
solid economic foundation for separating the interests of shareholders and
employees from those of other corporate constituents. It is not, however, the
only theoretical justification for that separation. In this part, we explore the
lessons that democratic theory has to offer to corporate governance. In
particular, we look at governance from the broad perspective of preference
aggregation and develop a theory of democratic participation that allows us to
determine whose preferences are best captured through voting rather than
contract. We then apply that framework to corporate governance and find that
it, too, counsels in favor of shared governance between shareholders and
employees.
A. Corporations and Democracy
All of the institutions that comprise modern market-based societies—from
large governments to small businesses—employ decisionmaking structures
designed to take account of the preferences of their constituents. They
sometimes rely upon compacts or contracts, which are thought to ensure the
preference satisfaction of everyone involved.248 Once institutions reach a certain
size and complexity, though, contracts alone cannot do the job: they must resort
to some type of voting mechanism to aggregate preferences. This is true of
almost all institutions, both political and corporate, that claim to serve some sort
of constituency. It is certainly true of the modern corporation.
248

See, e.g., Stephen E. Ellis & Grant M. Hayden, The Cult of Efficiency in Corporate
Law, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 239, 248-49 (2010).
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Since corporate governance involves, at least in part, the use of voting
mechanisms to aggregate preferences, it seems reasonable to turn to political
theory in analyzing its structures and relationships. Public choice theory, with
its emphasis on the interests of different groups and its analysis of the effect of
different structures on outcomes, would seem to present a natural methodology
for studying corporate governance.249 More generally, political theory concerns
the allocation and transfer of power in decisionmaking and the roles of different
institutions in the governance of a polity. That said, economics, so far, has
dominated corporate law to the almost complete exclusion of political theory,
perhaps because corporate law theorists are sometimes suspicious of political
analogies (despite borrowing what they think is useful).250 And while we
obviously think economics has its place in the discussion, politics may also be
instructive at the fundamental level of the structure of the corporation.
This is not to say that political and corporate institutions, or political and
corporate voting, are the same thing. For example, those who currently vote in
corporate elections—shareholders—may enter and exit the corporation more
freely than citizens can move between polities; and shareholder voting, as
currently structured, is a relatively meaningless exercise in terms of exerting
influence over most corporate decisions.251 These points are well taken. But at
some level of generality, both types of institutions purport to have governance
structures designed to aggregate preferences. The purpose of a system of
governance is to manage different interests despite the opportunities for
conflict.252
249

See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE
(1991).
250
See Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 256-57, 323-24; Ian B. Lee, Citizenship and the
Corporation, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 129 (2009) (discussing how economic theory
has dominated corporate law and arguing that political theory should play a larger role).
Public choice theory has been used in corporate law in the context of competition
between states, competition within states, and competition between the states
(particularly Delaware) and the federal government. See, e.g., RALPH WINTER,
GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV.
469, 469-73 (1987); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2493
(2005).
251
Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy,
63 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1397-1404 (2006).
252
FEDERALIST TEN, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS 43 (Gary Wills, ed. 1982) (defining faction as “a number of
citizens amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated
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For that reason, examining how voting works in political institutions may
help illuminate some of the arguments around corporate governance. 253 The
disagreements over corporate governance law, after all, aren’t usually about
whether corporations should be structured to maximize the preference
satisfaction of their constituents, broadly defined, but how best to do so. The
same types of questions animate discussions of both political and corporate
voting.
One central set of questions, of course, is which constituents count, and how
do we identify them and best capture their preferences? But there are other,
related questions as well. Should the voting system be direct, representative, or
some mixture of the two? If representative, what is the basis for representation,
and how responsive should the system be? Work on these questions in the
political realm can help us think about the structure of governance within the
corporation.
1.

Interested Parties

The right to vote is seen as the most basic of political rights.254 Voting is a
way of integrating preferences into a governance system. Systems that aggregate
preferences typically limit input to people who have a stake or interest in the
enterprise.255 When possible, the degree of input may be calibrated with the

by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community”); see also David
Ciepley, Is the U.S. Government a Corporation?: The Corporate Origins of Modern
Constitutionalism, 111 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 418, 431-32 (2017) (making a connection
between the structure of corporate charters and colonial charters).
253
Michael S. Kang, Shareholder Voting As Veto, 88 IND. L.J. 1299, 1345 (2013)
(analogizing the theory of shareholder voting as veto to consociationalism, a system of
national governance that permits rival socio-ethnic groups a mutual veto over sensitive
government policies).
254
See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 61 (1971) (describing political liberty
as “the right to vote and to be eligible for public office”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 555 (1964) (“The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the
essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of
representative government.”).
255
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 452-56; Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise
of One Person, One Vote, 102 MICH. L. REV. 213, 251-61 (2003); Melvyn R. Durchslag,
Salyer, Ball, and Hold: Reappraising the Right to Vote in Terms of Political “Interest”
and Vote Dilution, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV 1, 38-39 (1982).
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weight of that interest, or the strength of those preferences.256 We aggregate the
preferences of interested parties to ensure more thoughtful decisionmaking and
lend a measure of legitimacy to electoral outcomes. And, indeed, most
discussions of governance systems—corporate and political—take it for granted
that input should be limited to those with an interest in the enterprise. 257 After
that, though, the disagreements start almost immediately. They resolve into a
couple different issues. First, who has interests that are sufficiently substantial
to merit some kind of input into the future of the enterprise? Second, how are
those interests best captured: through mutual agreement, voting, or some
mixture of the two?258
The modern corporate structure dictates that the shareholders have their
preferences captured through voting—primarily by voting on boards of
directors, but also, in some cases like mergers or dissolutions, more directly—
and all other constituents, from employees to suppliers to customers, have their
preferences captured largely through individual agreements.259 From the
perspective of preference aggregation, voting is used to capture an ongoing set
of preferences that are then translated into a system of governance for the firm.
As an institutional entity, it needs a process whereby it can make decisions,
effectuate actions, and carry on business. The shareholders have been designated
as the body politic whose preferences are collated through various voting
procedures.
The basic corporate stakeholders—those with an interest in firm
decisionmaking—are fairly well known. Employees, shareholders, suppliers,
customers, contractors, and even the community at large all have interests in the
operation of a typical corporation. The nature of their interests, of course, may
vary tremendously between groups and, as we’ve seen before, even within
groups.260 This is true both with respect to the content of their preferences (what
they care about) and the strength of the preferences (how much they care). With
few exceptions, both democratic and economic theorists take the contents of
preferences as they come. In politics, for example, we don’t prevent people from
voting because of whom they support or what they believe. 261 Standard
256

See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 456-58; Hayden, supra note 254, at 248.
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 452-60, 463-64.
258
These two questions are not unrelated, but in order to think through some of the
issues here, we think it helps to keep them separated.
259
See supra, notes 47-49, and accompanying text.
260
See supra, notes 69-72, and accompanying text.
261
For example, this is the intuition that underpins Kenneth Arrow’s condition of
democratic fairness typically referred to as universal admissibility. See Grant M.
257
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economics treats preferences much the same way, or, if anything, elevates them
to an even more exalted position. Revealed preference theory holds that the best
way to tell what consumers want is to observe their purchasing decisions.262
Economists do not typically claim that consumers didn’t (or shouldn’t) really
want something—they just register existing preferences and build their theories
accordingly.
The strength of constituent interests is a different matter. While we don’t
tell citizens or consumers what to care about, we do make basic decisions about
the structure of governance based on how much we think they care, how much
they have at stake in the outcome of government or firm decisionmaking.
Ideally, in both polities and corporations, we figure out who has strong interests
in the enterprise and assign them the right to vote—a voice in the governance
process.263 Those with a sufficient level of interest vote; those with even more
interest may get some type of additional weight added to their vote.264 We
believe that those with strong preferences about a matter are the ones who
deserve to have their preferences aggregated.
Though it makes sense as an initial matter to tie voting to preference
strength, we immediately run into a problem: we do not have a foolproof way to
measure the strength of anybody’s preferences.265 We could, of course, just ask
people how strongly they felt about an election outcome. But, with voting or,
more generally, governance, tied to interest, people would have an incentive to
strategically misrepresent the strength of their preferences. And even if we had
accurate reports from people about how strong their interests were in an election,
we lack a method of neutrally comparing those reports to those of others who
report having an interest. There is no universal scale upon which to measure
Hayden, Some Implications of Arrow’s Theorem for Voting Rights, 47 STAN. L. REV.
295, 298 (1995); see also WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF
SOCIAL CHOICE 217 (1982).
262
See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 NW. U.
L. REV. 4, 4-6 (1994).
263
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 452-60, 463-64.
264
See id. at 456-58; Hayden, supra note 254, at 248.
265
But cf. Christopher S. Elmendorf & Abby K. Wood, Elite Political Ignorance: Law,
Data, and the Representation of (Mis)perceived Electorates, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
571, 574 (2018) (noting that “[r]ecent technological developments” and “ever more
sophisticated machine-learning algorithms to merged voter, consumer, and social media
databases may, before long, yield a vastly more detailed and accurate picture of voter
preferences”).
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people’s preference strength; no way, in other words, to carry out interpersonal
utility comparisons in a completely objective manner.266
For these and other reasons, our political system has not generally relied
upon first-person reports to assess preference strength and, thus, the right to
participate. Instead, it has relied upon other proxies, or markers, for a person’s
interest in the outcome of an election.267 Throughout our history, states have
relied on a wide variety of such markers, such as property-holding, taxpaying,
or residency.268 Ultimately, the decision is this: whether the person, based on
certain factors relative to their person, should have the right to participate in
governance.
2.

Marking Interest

The search for a good marker for voter interest boils down to coming up
with an indicator that is both accurate and manageable.269 The accuracy of a
marker is a measure of how well it picks out the group of people who have a
sufficient interest in the outcome of an election. A marker could be off by either
including too many people who lack a sufficient interest or excluding people
who have a strong interest; in other words, it could be overinclusive or
underinclusive. With an overinclusive marker, we risk extending the franchise
to those with a weak or nonexistent interest in the election, thus diluting the
votes of those with a stronger interest. An underinclusive marker is even
worse—it leads to outright disenfranchisement of those with a real stake in the
266

For a summary of the problem of making interpersonal utility comparisons, see
Hayden, supra note 260, at 236-47; Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson,
Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and
Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2129 (1990) (discussing the difficulty
of “democratic voting rules or procedures for collective decision making [that] would
be able to aggregate existing individual preference rankings into a single, consistent
collective outcome”). For more general background in the area, see INTERPERSONAL
COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991); JAMES
GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE
113-20 (1986); Peter Hammond, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and How
They Are and Should Be Made, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING
200, 238-254 (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991).
267
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 454.
268
See id. at 454-56; Hayden, supra note 254, at 255-59. Cf. Paul David Meyer, Citizens,
Residents, and the Body Politic, 102 CAL. L. REV. 465, 468 (2014) (arguing that lawful
permanent residents should have voting rights).
269
For an extended discussion of this, see Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 460-62.
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outcome.270 When it comes to assigning weight to votes, the accuracy of the
marker depends on whether and how well it can be calibrated to the strength of
voter preferences.
Of course, we have no direct way of assessing the accuracy of any marker
because, as mentioned above, we have no direct way of measuring and
comparing preference strength to begin with. Instead, as in any other situation,
we have to made educated guesses about how much various people are affected
by the decisionmaking of a particular elected body and make an assumption that
the people more strongly affected will be those with stronger electoral
preferences. These judgments about the strength of people’s interest may be
contested, but they are essential to get any voting system up and running.
We make these kinds of judgments all the time in the political arena. The
early freehold requirements, for example, were an attempt to capture one’s stake
in an election, and they were fine as far as they went (that is, those with a large
amount of property did have an interest in elections), but they were
underinclusive, disenfranchising large numbers of property-less people who
were, nonetheless, also greatly affected by the exercise of governmental
powers.271 More contemporary requirements, such as residency and citizenship,
seem like better (though still imperfect) markers of voter interest. For example,
those who are residents within the jurisdiction of a particular government are
subject to its police powers, taxation, and services, and thus have quite a bit at
stake in an election. Residency isn’t perfect, of course. It’s a little
underinclusive, in that it fails to capture those who work or own property in one
place and reside in another. At times, it can also be overinclusive, as when it
allows people to vote who plan to move out of town right after election day. But
despite debates around the margins, most agree that residency is a more accurate
marker for voter interest than, say, owning property.272 And, in the United States,
when state and local governments tinker too much and try to use markers that
are too overinclusive or underinclusive, they are often disallowed from doing so
for that very reason. New York, for example, attempted to limit voting in certain
school district elections to people who either had school-aged children or owned
or leased taxable property in the district.273 The U.S. Supreme Court
acknowledged that voting may be tied to interest, but struck these particular

270

See id. Of course, we could stitch together more than one underinclusive marker and
better capture voter interest.
271
See id. at 461.
272
See id.
273
See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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markers as both overinclusive and underinclusive,274 explaining, that “[s]tatutes
granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose the danger of
denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which
substantially affect their lives.”275
Of course, we could always come up with some more extensive survey of
voter interest to get a better fix on whether any particular person has a strong
interest in the outcome of an election.276 For example, perhaps a survey reveals
that while both Luke and Ben are residents of a certain town, Ben plans to move
away in just a few weeks. A third potential voter, Milo, lives nearby, but works
and owns property in town, including the house where his elderly, dependent
mother lives. With such information, we might conclude that, while residency is
a good starting point, our additional information reveals that, really, Luke and
Milo have sufficient interest in the jurisdiction to vote, and Ben, despite his
current residency, does not. But this kind of individualized preference
information would be incredibly costly to obtain, much less keep up to date.
And, of course, if we obtain this information by asking everyone about their
interests, we’d worry about strategic misrepresentation.277 But, in any case, an
ongoing process of surveying everyone about their potential interests in every
jurisdiction is simply unworkable, which brings us to the second feature of any
good marker: its manageability.278
Democratic institutions have long valued markers for voter interest that are
easily managed. The property-holding and taxpaying requirements of old were
not only useful because they ensured that voters had a financial stake in election
outcomes, they did so with information that was readily available to the state. In
fact, the state and local governments that ran the elections usually had lists of
both property holders and taxpayers, which made it very easy to administer the
voter rolls.279 Residency has been a little harder to pin down—state and local
governments do not, usually, have ready lists of all of their residents—so
residency is often confirmed by requesting some sort of identification with a
name and address on it (a utility bill, for example); if one’s residency is
questioned, it is ultimately something that can be easily confirmed.
Manageability, then, is a key feature of any marker used to pick out a potential
voter’s interest in the outcome of an election.
274

Id. at 632 n.15.
Id. at 626-27.
276
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 462.
277
See id.
278
See id. at 461.
279
See id.
275
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B. Who Should Vote?
Developing a method of aggregating individual preferences, then, demands
that we first figure out whose preferences to aggregate. This typically involves
finding some way to measure the level of interest that a potential voter has in the
outcome of an election. Because we do not have direct. reliable access to that
kind of information, we usually depend upon some sort of marker for that
interest. We generally divide the electorate into those whose preferences can be
expressed through voting, and those who preferences cannot. Until now,
corporate governance has allowed only shareholders to express their preferences
through votes. But it is time to reexamine this reality.
As detailed earlier, the longstanding theory of the firm counsels that two
groups of constituents—shareholders and employees—have a special
relationship to the corporation that militates in favor of assigning voting rights
to them. This gives us symmetry between contribution and participation. In this
part, we argue that core features of democratic theory—the tie between voting
and interest and the accompanying need for markers of that interest—point in
the same direction. Here, too, there are features of shareholders and employees
that allow us to distinguish them from other stakeholders. Most simply, their
relationship with the firm gives them the accurate and manageable markers of
interest that other corporate constituents, in ordinary business situations, lack.
1.

Shareholders

For shareholders, the value of the capital contribution and the percentage of
the dividend interest provide fairly quantifiable measures of the shareholder’s
interest in the corporation. Putting aside any outside interests of the shareholder,
the allocation of one vote for each share accurately correlates to the
shareholder’s financial interest in the corporation.280 The system of one share,
one vote calibrates the level of interest with the level of input. Shareholding, in
other words, appears to be both an accurate and manageable marker of interest
in a corporation, and thus shareholders should be accorded voting rights.
However, the familiarity of this conclusion belies the complicating factors
to this democratic argument for shareholder voting. Although shares are
originally sold for the same price during the initial public offering, publiclyEASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 72 (“The most basic statutory voting
rule is the same in every state. It is this: all common shares vote, all votes have the same
weights, and no other participant in the venture votes, unless there is some agreement
to the contrary. Such agreements are rare.”).
280
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traded shares soon enter the marketplace, where their values may change
drastically over time. One shareholder may have purchased Facebook shares for
$30 in 2012, while recent shareholders may have paid over $200.281 Although
everyone’s shares may have the same value at any given moment in time,
individual shareholders have likely invested different amounts per share to
obtain those shares (and votes).
Shareholders also have differing interests outside the firm. Those interests
may swamp the shareholder’s interest in the corporation’s residual. Shareholders
may tailor their financial holdings to match shareholder voting power with
countervailing interests in derivatives or short positions.282 They may have
personal interests, such as family ties283 or religious and political values,284 that
conflict with the principle of shareholder wealth maximization. The
shareholders themselves may be social investing funds285 or sovereign wealth
funds286 or an algorithm.287 Pension funds may want to promote worker power,
while hedge funds may want to make a quick sale after juicing up the price.
Shareholders do not have “pure” interests as shareholders, no more than citizens
have “pure” interests in the republic.
There is also an accuracy issue when it comes to measuring shareholder
preferences in that it may not be worth the shareholder’s time and investment to
correlate the vote in question accurately with the shareholder’s preferences. The
shareholder interest for those holding only a few shares is rather weak. The move
to passive index funds further removes the shareholder’s interests from any
Cf. Matt Phillips, Facebook’s Stock Plunge Shatters Faith in Tech Companies’
Invincibility,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
23,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/business/facebook-stock-earnings-call.html.
282
See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 816 (2006); Shaun Martin &
Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 780 (2005) (discussing
“economically encumbered” and “legally encumbered” shares).
283
Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1185 (2013).
284
See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 733 (2005).
285
See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and
Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, STAN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2020).
286
See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate
Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345
(2008).
287
See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 680 (2013).
281
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effort to express those interests through a vote.288 Fully diversified shareholders
are close to indifferent to the fortunes of any particular corporation.
There are also underappreciated difficulties in the manageability of
shareholder voting. Shareholder governance is still centered around the idea of
the annual shareholders meeting, which shareholders in theory are expected to
attend.289 If unable to attend, shareholders designate their voting power to
proxies, who then act on their behalf. Shareholders receive proxy ballots from
the incumbent board, which makes the process much easier while subverting its
democratic nature. Add to this the fact that modern shareholding is generally
managed through intermediaries who hold the shares on behalf of the actual
owner.290 As Ewan McGaughey pointed out, it’s quite often the case that “[a]sset
managers control shareholder voting rights with other people’s money.”291
Confusion over voting rights can abound in the context of custodial ownership,
short sales, lending shares, and changes in ownership after the record date.292
Trading shares is also accomplished through lightning-fast technology, and the
allocation of particular shares to particular holders has not caught up with this
technology.293 Although certain reforms may address particular uncertainties

288

See Lund, supra note 6, at 497 (proposing that lawmakers should restrict truly
passive funds from voting at shareholder meetings because of their lack of interests in
voting).
289
William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Case Against Mandatory Annual Director Elections
and Shareholders' Meetings, 74 TENN. L. REV. 199, 201 (2007) (discussing the
“mandatory requirement under state corporate law and stock exchange listing standards
that public corporations hold annual shareholders' meetings for the election of
director”).
290
Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections
on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in A More Rational System of Corporate
Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 6-7 (2007) (discussing the “separation of ownership from
ownership,” namely that “the equity of public corporations is often owned, not by the
end-user investors, but by another form of agency, a mutual fund, or other institutional
investor”).
291
Ewan McGaughey, Democracy in America at Work: The History of Labor’s Vote in
Corporate Governance, 42 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 697, 746 (2019).
292
Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1227, 1231 (2008) (“The inescapable complexity combined with the already wellstudied issues of shareholders’ rational apathy and free rider problems detract from the
case for shareholder voting.”).
293
George Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 227, 22829 (2019) (noting the failure to connect particular shares with their owners in the context
of electronic trading).
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over voting rights for particular shares,294 there remain difficulties in matching
up particular shareholders with voting rights in a particular election.
But despite these concerns, shareholders have sufficiently defined interests
to provide accurate and manageable markers for their voting rights. They have
a clear stake in the outcome of decisionmaking. They have a straightforward
way to calibrate the strength of their interest. And because shareholders provide
unencumbered capital to the corporation in exchange for certain rights to the
residual profits, they cannot register their preferences meaningfully through
agreement alone; they need a governance mechanism. Shareholder voting rights
are designed to manage those preferences.
2.

Employees

Employment is also an accurate and manageable marker of interest in the
success of a corporation. Employees have an interest in the value of the
corporation as expressed through their continued employment. A worker
contributes to the process of joint production through her labor and creates both
specific value (creation of a particular good or service) and longer-term
indefinite value (the value of the ongoing business as expressed through good
will, trademark, and share price). Employees receive wages and benefits and
may, in some cases, participate as shareholders through a 401(k) plan. But they
also have an interest in the ongoing business of the company simply by virtue of
having a job. This job renders them participants in the ongoing production and
entitles them to have a voice in the joint production process through the
governance of the firm.
As compared with shareholders, it is both easier and more difficult to
correlate employment interests with a schema of voting rights within the firm.
Employees are smaller in number, easier to keep track of, and have an
attachment to the firm that makes the logistics of election participation easier to
manage. At the same time, there are more factors that could complicate the
assignment of particular voting interests to employees. First, the category of
employment is less clearly defined than the category of shareholder. The test for
“employment” has traditionally been the common-law control test, which asks
whether the employer has the right to control the action of the employee within
the scope of employment.295 The test has uncertain boundaries and can result in
294

Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1958) (defining a
servant/employee as: “a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another
295
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uncertainty over whether a particular worker is an employee or an independent
contractor.296 At the same time, however, corporations officially designate their
employees for tax purposes and withhold employee income taxes. 297 This tax
designation would be a relatively straightforward way to delineate employees in
the first instance, and then workers could contest that designation if they felt
improperly excluded from the employment rolls.
Corporations may also struggle over the specific voting rights to be granted
to each employee. The easiest system to administer would allocate one set of
voting rights to each employee. But employees might object to this allocation
along a variety of lines, arguing instead that employees with more seniority,
higher wages, more hours, or greater stature within the company deserve greater
voting rights. Unlike a unit of shares, a unit of “employment” is not the same for
each employee in terms of interest in the firm. The conflict over the allocation
of employee voting rights is one reason why commentators have argued against
them.298
But this disparity between shareholders and employees can also be
overstated. As discussed above, shareholder voting rights are not always
allocated along the lines of “one share, one vote.” Many of the largest and most
prominent companies—Google, Facebook, Viacom—have allocated voting
rights disproportionately among shareholder groups to give a group of founders,
family members, or insiders more power relative to their fellow stockholders.
and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is
subject to the other’s control or right to control”).
296
Id. § 220 cmt. c (noting that the employment relationship is “one not capable of exact
definition”); Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 661, 682-83 (2013) (“Courts and commentators continue to bemoan [the
control test’s] inability to deliver clear answers.”).
297
Firms are expected to differentiate between employees and independent contractors
over a host of provisions, including whether taxes need to be withheld, 26 U.S.C. §§
3401(c), 3402 (2018), whether the firm must pay a share of Social Security and
Medicare (FICA), id. §§ 3101, 3121(d), and unemployment (FUTA) taxes, id. §§ 3301,
3306(i), for the worker, and whether the workers count as employees for benefit plan
purposes. Id. § 410(a). The IRS defines employees based on the common law control
test. Id. § 3121(d)(2) (defining an employee as, among other definitions, “any individual
who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employeremployee relationship, has the status of an employee”).
298
HANSMANN, supra note 82; Henry Hansmann, Employee Ownership and Unions:
Lessons from the Airline Industry, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE EMERGING
WORKPLACE: ALTERNATIVES/SUPPLEMENTS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 573-80
(Samuel Estreicher, ed., Kluwer Law International, 1998).
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These companies made this choice based on competing interests in providing
more governance to a select group based on that group’s role within the firm.299
Similar analyses could apply in the employee voting rights context: the company
could design a system of voting rights based on the relative importance of
employee voice to the company.300 For now, corporations would face the choice
of a straightforward allocation of employee voting rights—one employee, one
vote—or decide to assign voting rights based on a more nuanced analysis of
employee interests.
One other structural concern with adding employee voting rights into the
corporate governance mix is their potential incommensurability with
shareholder voting rights. If we have one share, one vote on one side, and one
employee, one vote on the other, how will we match up these two systems? How
many shares’ worth of votes will one employee have? But matching up two sets
of voters is by no means impossible, and it’s certainly not a reason to shut out a
group of otherwise qualified constituents out of board elections.
When it comes to allocating voting power between shareholders and
employees, we imagine that most corporations would want to take one of two
approaches. The first would provide for separate systems of voting rights in
which there would be no need to measure commensurability. So, for example,
shareholders would vote for a set of shareholder directors, and employee would
vote for a set of employee directors. The voting rights would not need to be
commensurable as they would be participating in different elections. Both the
German system of codetermination301 and bills recently introduced in the U.S.
Senate track this approach.302
The second possible system would combine shareholders and employees
into a single electorate. The corporation would then have to make a judgment
299

See Lund, supra note 8, at 714-37 (discussing the benefits of a disproportionate
voting structure).
300
Recent innovations in employee participatory governance structures include
holacracy and other participatory (or “evolutionary”) management structures. See
LALOUX, supra note 15; ROBERTSON, supra note 15.
301
Andreas Rühmkorf, Company law and corporate governance in Germany: From
stakeholder value to corporate sustainability?, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY (Beate Sjåfell &
Christopher Bruner eds., 2019); Ewan McGaughey, The Codetermination Bargains:
The History of German Corporate and Labor Law, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 135, 136
(2016).
302
Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018); Reward Work Act, S.
2605, 115th Cong. (2018).
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about how to weight the votes of individual shareholders and employees.
Corporations following this approach would probably start with a judgement
about the general allocation of voting power between shareholders and
employees, and then translate that into individual voting weights. So, for
example, a corporation could decide that employees should have roughly forty
percent303 of the voting rights within the corporation, and then allocate votes
between the two groups based on this rough proportion.304
At this stage, it’s enough to say that the logistical challenges are not
insurmountable.305 More importantly, they do not justify the exclusion of a set
of corporate participants from participation in governance. Employees are
participants in the firm and contribute their efforts to the process of joint
production. They should not be excluded from governance simply because we
currently have systems in place that find it easier to exclude them.
3.

Other Corporate Constituents

The theory of the firm and democratic participation theory both counsel in
favor of extending the corporate franchise to shareholders and employees. Those
two groups deserve voting rights because they are within the economic firm—
they participate in a process of joint production as carried on by the firm. They
also have the accurate and manageable markers of interest that allow for the
creation of a workable system of corporate governance. The same, however,
cannot be said of other corporate constituents.
Along with the theory of the firm, democratic participation theory provides
a second means of separating the insiders—shareholders and employees—from
other constituents outside the corporation. With most firms, it doesn’t make
sense to capture the preferences of creditors, customers, suppliers, and other
constituencies though the franchise. This is both because their interests in the
success of the firm are not as significant as those of the insiders and because
their status and relationship with the firm do not provide particularly accurate or
303

Cf. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018) (assigning employees
with voting rights to 40% of the board).
304
One problem with this type of system is that if one group or the other has a majority
of the votes, they can completely dictate the outcomes of winner-take-all elections.
305
The mixed interests of employees and shareholders comes into play in startup
companies, where founders and employees generally have equity positions along with
wages and benefits. For a discussion of the unique governance challenges in new
companies poised for growth, see Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA.
L. REV. 155 (2019).
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manageable markers of that interest. For those reasons, participation theory
generally counsels against extending the franchise to these outside stakeholders.
Take, for example, the customers of a large corporation. Customers
certainly have some relationship with a firm such that they have a stake in, and
preferences regarding, its success. But their interest in the continued success of
the company is more tenuous, and their ongoing contacts with the company,
even assuming the planned obsolescence of the latest product, are likely to be
relatively sporadic. Their status as customers is not a particularly strong marker
for interest in the future success of the firm. It’s also not a particularly
manageable marker, given that the company’s interaction with the person may
be limited to the point of sale, if that; after that, tracking the customers becomes
more difficult.306 The same may be said of a corporation’s suppliers, though the
relationship may be a little closer there, and the markers a little more
manageable. Similarly, creditors may have manageable markers—amount of
debt, for example—but they have structured their capital investment as
repayable and often secured, while shareholders have provided their equity
contributions with no expectation of repayment.
Of course, there may be certain types of customers, suppliers, or even
creditors who enjoy a continuous and significant relationship with a corporation
such that they have a more significant interest and it’s more manageable to
identify them for the purpose of extending the franchise. Some utility customers,
for example, have that kind of relationship with their providers.307 And in those
situations, democratic participation theory may counsel in favor of extending
them voting rights.308

306

This may change with the increased online interaction between consumers and
producers, particularly on social media. See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF
SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 135-37 (2019).
307
HANSMANN, supra note 82, at 168-73 (discussing how rural electrical cooperatives
involve ownership by customers); Yosifon, Lock-In, supra note 202, at 1449-59
(arguing that consumers may have ongoing interests through lock-in purchases).
308
In the nineteenth century, shares in companies providing vital infrastructure services
such as transportation, banking, and insurance were often purchased by local merchants
and farmers who used those services. These low-stakes shareholders were protected by
restricted voting schemes which gave their shares more power within the governance
structure. Scholars have debated whether these protections were more a form of investor
protection or consumer protection. Compare Dunlavy, supra note 33, at 1354-56
(investor protection), with Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of
Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948, 953-54
(2014) (consumer protection).
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Democratic participation theory is certainly flexible enough to deal with
unique customer bases and the possible rise of accurate and manageable markers
of constituent interest, and assign voting rights accordingly.309 For now, though,
in the regular course of corporate governance, it militates in favor of extending
voting rights to shareholders and employees and leaving the interests of other
constituents to contract or government regulation.
C. The German Experience
Shareholder primacy is so deeply entrenched in American corporate law and
scholarship that it’s sometimes difficult to imagine any other way of thinking
about the corporation. This lack of imagination may help explain why arguments
for the shareholder franchise—despite their shortcomings—continue to plod
along in the background of an awful lot of scholarship. There are, however,
alternative models, some of which involve employee representation.
The United States may not have much of a history of employee involvement
in corporate governance,310 but a majority of European Union and OECD
countries give employees access to corporate boards.311 Of these, Germany’s
system of codetermination is perhaps the most well-known.312 It has also been
309

See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 219, at 124 (discussing the use of voting rights to
manage stakeholder interests within socially-oriented business enterprises).
310
For a comprehensive rundown, see Ewan McGaughey, Democracy in America at
Work: The History of Labor’s Vote in Corporate Governance, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
697 (2019).
311
For a recent list of countries, see Ewan McGaughey, Votes at Work in Britain:
Shareholder Monopolisation and the “Single Channel,” 47 INDUS. L.J. 76, 79-80, 79
n.17, & 80 fig.1 (2018). For information on countries outside of Germany, see Klas
Levinson, Codetermination in Sweden: Myth and Reality, 21 ECON. & INDUS. DEM. 457
(2000); Caspar Rose, The Challenges of Employee-Appointed Board Members for
Corporate Governance: The Danish Evidence, 9 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 215 (2008);
Milan Utroša, Works Councils and Co-Determination in Slovenia, 1 SE EUR. REV. 23
(1998); Eivind Falkum, Inger M. Hagen & Sissel C. Trygstad, Participation and
Codetermination among Norwegian Employees – State of the Art 2009, Conference
Paper, 9th IIRA European Congress, June-July 2010, Copenhagen, available at:
https://faos.ku.dk/pdf/iirakongres2010/track2/38.pdf/.
312
The term “codetermination” actually describes two very different features of German
corporations, and we are using the terminology from Otto Sandrock & Jean J. du Plessis,
The German System of Supervisory Codetermination by Employees, in GERMAN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 167, 169
(Jean J. du Plessis et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017). “Social codetermination” involves employee
representation on shop-level works councils at all companies with at least five
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in place for decades as part of a large, modern economy, making it an
exemplar.313
Codetermination laws dictate the composition of the supervisory boards for
large German companies.314 The degree of employee representation depends on
a number of factors, including the type of industry, the number of employees,
and a few other factors.315 Generally speaking, corporations with fewer than 500
employees have supervisory board members elected by shareholders;
corporations with 500 to 2000 employees must have one-third of their board
members elected by employees; and those with more than 2000 employees have
one-half of their supervisory board members elected by employees.316 Thus, in
employees. See id. at 169-71. “Supervisory codetermination,” on the other hand,
describes employee representation at the level of the corporate board. See id. at 169.
313
See Robert Scholz & Sigurt Vitols, Board-level codetermination: A Driving Force
for Corporate Social Responsibility in German Companies?, 25 EUR. J. IND. REL. 233,
233-34 (2019).
314
See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 312, at 172-78. Germany uses a two-tiered
board system. See Jean J. du Plessis et al., An Overview of German Business or
Enterprise Law and the One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Systems Contrasted, in GERMAN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note
312, at 1, 8-13. Supervisory boards are roughly analogous to corporate boards in the
United States, exercising general oversight of the company and appointing members of
the management board. See Jean J. du Plessis & Otto Saenger, The Supervisory Board
as Company Organ, in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND
EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note 312, at 105, 133-53; Jean J. du Plessis & Otto
Saenger, The General Meeting and the Management Board as Company Organs, in
GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT,
supra note 312, at 63, 73. The management board, much like the officers in the United
States, run the company and make the day-to-day business decisions. Thilo Kuntz,
German Corporate Law in the 20th Century, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
HISTORY OF CORPORATE AND COMPANY LAW 205 (Harwell Wells ed., 2018).
315
See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 312, at 182-83.
316
See Jean J. du Plessis & Ingo Saenger, An Overview of the Corporate Governance
Debate in Germany, in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND
EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note 312, at 17, 48-49; Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note
312, at 173-78; JOHN T. ADDISON, THE ECONOMICS OF CODETERMINATION: LESSONS
FROM THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE 103 (2009); Otto Sandrock, German and
International Perspectives of the German Model of Codetermination, 26 EUR. BUS. L.
REV. 129, 131-32 (2015). In most of these large companies with one-half
codetermination, employees enjoy “quasi-parity” because shareholders elect the chair
(and potential tiebreaker vote). In the coal, iron, and steel industries, however, there is
a neutral chair (and tiebreaker), giving the employees “full parity,” or a truly shared
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Germany, we have a longstanding example of shared corporate governance, with
shareholder and employee representatives working side by side on the
supervisory boards of major companies.
For decades, codetermination has received little more than passing attention
from American corporate governance scholars.317 It shows up most often in a
variant of the contractarian argument for the exclusive shareholder franchise.
Codetermination, it is argued, must be inefficient because it has not been
voluntarily adopted by American firms. In fact, the only way a firm would end
up with employee board representation is if you force it to do so, as Germany
does by law. Nobody freely chooses codetermination; it is therefore less efficient
than having shareholders run the show.318
system of governance. See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 312, at 173-76. This is
true of companies in these sectors at a lower threshold—1000 instead of 2000
employees. Volkswagen is a special case. Along with 50 percent representation for the
workers, the government of Lower Saxony also has seats on the board, which gives the
workers a de facto majority (because of traditional government support for the workers).
In addition, the voting rights of individual shareholders are limited to a maximum of 20
percent for any particular shareholder. Law of 21 July 1960 on the privatisation of
equity in the Volkswagenwerk limited company (Gesetz über die Überführung der
Anteilsrechte an der Volkswagenwerk Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung in private
Hand, BGBl. 1960 I, p. 585, and BGBl. 1960 III, p. 641-1-1); JACK EWING, FASTER,
HIGHER, FARTHER: THE VOLKSWAGEN SCANDAL 57 (2017),
317
See, e.g., CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 295-96 (Lucian Arye
Bebchuk ed., 1990) (one passing reference to codetermination); EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 69 (again, one passing reference to codetermination);
HANSMANN, supra note 82, at 110-12 (1996) (a few pages); BAINBRIDGE, supra note
88, at 47-49 (a few pages); JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 230 (2008) (some passing references to the
German system). But see EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163-235
(Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) (a lengthy examination of
codetermination).
318
The argument may have been first (and in any case, most forcefully) made by
Michael Jensen and William Meckling in the late 1970s. Michael C. Jensen & William
H. Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed
Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. BUS. 469, 473-75, 503-04 (1979). Many other
scholars have made variants of the same point. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An Organizational Failures Analysis,
23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 1054 (1998) (noting that “German codetermination was
created by sweeping statutory mandates” and concluding it was unlikely to be adopted
through private ordering); George W. Dent, Jr., Stakeholder Governance: A Bad Idea
Getting Worse, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1107, 1115 (2008); Hansmann & Kraakman,
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In the last few years, however, the key assumption underlying the
argument—that codetermination can only arise through fiat, not voluntary
agreement—has itself been revealed to be false. Ewan McGaughey, a legal
historian and economist, recently showed that German codetermination first
arose through collective agreements and only later was enacted into law.319 This
history shows that the American law-and-economics scholars are not just wrong
on this point, but may have the picture completely backwards: German
codetermination was created by agreement not once but twice, while the law was
sometimes used to quash it.320 There are also many reasons to believe that a
shared system of government might not emerge from a free market of industrial
relations even if it is more efficient than the existing system.321
Theoretical arguments aside, how well has codetermination worked in
Germany? Much of the scholarship evaluating the system has centered on its
role in promoting broader goals such as social cohesion and fairness. 322 The
bottom-line, economic effects of codetermination are either seen as secondary
or as necessarily following from the achievement of these societal goals.323 That
is, codetermination is viewed less in terms of an economic system than as one
designed to promote a well-functioning democracy and help prevent social
supra note 2, at 445 (“The growing view today is that meaningful direct worker voting
participation in corporate affairs tends to produce inefficient decisions, paralysis, or
weak boards, and that these costs are likely to exceed any potential benefits that worker
participation might bring.”); Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Renier Kraakman &
Mariana Pargendler, The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and NonShareholder Constituencies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 79, 106 (John Armour et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017); ROBERTA
ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 129-30 (1993).
319
See Ewan McGaughey, The Codetermination Bargains: The History of German
Corporate and Labor Law, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 135 (2016).
320
See id. at 170.
321
See, e.g., Simon Renaud, Dynamic Efficiency of Supervisory Board Codetermination
in Germany, 21 LABOUR 689 (2007) (arguing that codetermination may not emerge
because allocation and distribution may not be separated, information asymmetries may
exist, and transaction costs in introducing such a system may be too high); David I.
Levine & Laura D. Tyson, Participation, Productivity, and the Firm’s Environment, in
PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY: A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 183 (Alan S. Blinder, ed.
1990) (arguing that codetermination needs to be adopted on a broad scale because
individual firms may find themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma with regard to their
existing entitlements and constituents).
322
See ADDISON, supra note 316, at 2.
323
See id.
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division—in particular, the division between labor and capital. And, on this
broad level, it is thought to be quite successful.
There are, however, a number of studies assessing the economic effects of
codetermination, with a consensus that has shifted back and forth over the last
four decades.324 Some early studies from the 1980s found that codetermination
had very little impact on corporate performance.325 Those studies, however,
were criticized on a number of methodological grounds,326 and several more
sophisticated evaluations in the 1990s and early 2000s gave a more pessimistic
account, finding that codetermination was associated with, among other things,
lower productivity and lower profits.327 That consensus, though, soon gave way
to a third phase in the literature, one that both reversed the principal findings of
the second-phase studies (finding them to be artifacts of a particular method of

324

For the best summary of the literature through 2008 and a discussion of the three
initial phases of research detailed below, see id. at 108-121; see also Uwe Jirjahn,
Ökonomische Wirkungen der Mitbestimmung in Deutschland: Ein Update,
ARBEITSPAPIER 186, Düsseldorf: Hans-Böckler-Stiftung (Feb. 2010).
325
See, e.g., Jan Svejnar, Relative Wage Effects of Unions, Dictatorship, and Codetermination: Econometric Evidence from Germany, 63 REV. ECON. & STATS. 188
(1981) (finding codetermination associated with higher earnings in the iron and steel
industry but not in the coal mining industry); Guiseppe Benelli et al., Labor
Participation in Corporate Policy-Making Decisions: West Germany’s Experience with
Codetermination, 60 J. BUS. 553 (1987) (finding no real differences between firms with
codetermination and without codetermination across a variety of measures of
performance); Michael A. Gurdon & Anoop Rai, Codetermination and Enterprise
Performance: Empirical Evidence from West Germany, 42 J. ECON. & BUS. 289 (1990)
(finding codetermination led to higher profitability but lower productivity).
326
See ADDISON, supra note 316, at 109. Those early studies were criticized for reasons
that included “sample size, data frequency (in the case of stock returns), lack of controls
for other relevant economic or organizational variables, focus on a single event, and
narrow reach.” Id.
327
See, e.g., Felix FitzRoy & Kornelius Kraft, Economic Effects of Codetermination,
95 SCAND. J. ECON. 365 (1993) (finding that the shift to quasi-parity codetermination
in 1976 had negative effect on productivity); Theodor Baums & Bernd Frick, Codetermination in Germany: The Impact of Court Decisions on the Market Value of
Firms, 1 ECON. ANALYSIS 143 (1998) (finding that court rulings that expanded or
restricted codetermination had no real effect on share price); Gary Gorton & Frank A.
Schmid, Capital, Labor, and the Firm: A Study of Codetermination, 2 J. EURO. ECON.
ASS’N 863 (2004) (finding that moving from one-third to quasi-parity codetermination
negatively affected shareholder wealth).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441307

2020]

THE CORPORATION REBORN

71

assessment)328 and found that codetermination was also modestly associated
with greater innovation.329 These more optimistic assessments were bolstered by
a couple of modern financial studies on the market value of the firm, which
found that “prudent” levels of employee representation led to better board
decisionmaking by improving monitoring and thus reducing agency costs.330
This third, rather optimistic phase of assessment brought us right up to one of
the most profound tests of all systems of corporate governance: the global
financial crisis.
The financial crisis did not spare any of the world’s major economies, but
some recovered more quickly than others. Germany, in particular, recovered
more quickly and more thoroughly than many other countries, and did so, at least
in part, because of its corporate governance model.331 While economic
downturns are always difficult for companies and their employees,
codetermination allows the management of many companies “to more easily
seek the consent of its workforce for carrying out more or less drastic
measures.”332 These measures include a system (Kurzarbeit) that temporarily
reduces the working hours (and salaries) of many of the employees.333 This
avoids painful layoffs and allows companies to retain their core workforces,
which in turn allowed the economy as a whole to avoid the worst of the
economic slump.334 This led one group of scholars to conclude: “Particular to
328

See, e.g., Felix FitzRoy & Kornelius Kraft, Co-determination, Efficiency, and
Productivity, 43 BRIT. J. IND. REL. 233 (2005); see also ADDISON, supra note 316, at
115-16, 120. The negative findings in the second phase of studies may have been
artefacts of the cross-section estimation they used, which (by definition) did not control
for firm heterogeneity or firm-specific effects. Id. at 115, 120.
329
See, e.g., Kornelius Kraft et al., Codetermination and Innovation, 35 CAMBRIDGE J.
ECON. 145 (2011); see also ADDISON, supra note 316, at 116.
330
See Larry Fauver & Michael E. Fuerst, Does Good Corporate Governance Include
Employee Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards, 82 J. FIN. ECON.
673 (2006); see also Simon Renaud, Dynamic Efficiency of Supervisory Board
Codetermination in Germany, 21 LABOUR 689 (2007).
331
See Jean J. du Plessis et al., Preface to GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note 314, at vii; Sandrock, supra
note 316, at 136. For some brief comparisons of the German recovery to that of other
countries, see Michael Burda & Jennifer Hunt, What Explains the German Labor
Market Miracle in the Great Recession?, 2011 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY 273-75.
332
See Sandrock, supra note 316, at 134.
333
See id.; Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 311, at 188-89, 193.
334
See Lutz Bellman et al., The German Labour Market Puzzle in the Great Recession,
in PRODUCTIVITY PUZZLES ACROSS EUROPE 187, 187-88 (Philippe Askenazy et al.
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Germany was the social partners’ willingness to work together during this
specific economic hardship. . . . it cannot be denied that the quality of industrial
relations was a factor in overcoming the crisis.”335
A number of new studies came out during and after the period of recovery
that were consistent with the third phase of the literature, showing that
codetermination generally had positive economic effects for a variety of
constituents, including shareholders. One of the stronger results in that regard
came from a 2019 study by Simon Jager, Benjamin Schoefer, and Jörg Heining,
which showed that shared governance was “associated with an increase in
capital formation and a shift towards more capital intensive production,”
probably because it facilitated cooperation between firms and their
employees.336 Shareholders, it turns out, may be better off investing in firms
where employees have a stronger governance role.
Employees, too, fared better (by their own measures) under
codetermination. A recent study by E. Han Kim, Ernst Maug, and Christoph
Scheider confirmed that employees at full-parity codetermined firms are better
protected against layoffs during industry downturns.337 This job security,
however, comes at the price of significantly lower wages. Employees at
codetermined firms pay a premium equal to 3.3 percent of their wages for this
employment insurance.338 Importantly, this swap of wages for job security has
no effect on shareholders one way or the other.339

eds., 2016); Sandrock, supra note 316, at 134; Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 312,
at 188-89, 193.
335
Bellman et al., supra note 334, at 229.
336
See Simon Jager, Benjamin Schoefer & Jörg Heining, Labor in the Boardroom 2829, available at http://economics.mit.edu/files/17273 (unpublished manuscript)
(emphasis added).
337
E. Han Kim, Ernst Maug & Christoph Scheider, Labor Representation in
Governance as an Insurance Mechanism, 2018 REV. FIN. 1251, 1286.
338
Id. at 1279, 1286. The benefit of this employment insurance was really only
experienced by white-collar and skilled blue-collar employees; unskilled blue-collar
workers do not receive much in the way of job security protections. Id. at 1286. The
authors of the study attribute this finding to the lack of real representation of unskilled
workers on supervisory boards. Id.
339
Id. at 1286. A similar finding was made in another recent paper. See Jager, Schoefer
& Heining, supra note 336, at 28 (concluding “we did not find that installing worker
representatives in German supervisory boards increased wages in these firms, nor did it
lead to more rent sharing”).
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Codetermination also benefits other corporate constituents, usually because
their interests line up with those of employees. Employee representation, for
example, turns out to be good for creditors because both groups are keenly
interested in the stability and long-term survival of the firm.340 Codetermination
is also positively related to a firm’s commitment to substantive corporate social
responsibility (CSR) measures, including setting concrete goals on emission
reductions, the publication of a separate CSR report (or section in its annual
report), and the presence of a job security (no-layoff) policy.341 These kinds of
secondary effects, along with recent performance of the German economy, may
have begun to change the way people view codetermination. Indeed, by 2016,
its popularity among the German people rose to an all-time high.342
So what does all this mean? To start with, the success of the German system
serves as an empirical rejoinder to the hypothetical arguments used by law and
economics scholars to justify the exclusive shareholder franchise.
Codetermination was born of consensual agreement at a time when labor and
capital had roughly equal bargaining power, and only later became enshrined in
law. German firms have not been paralyzed by more heterogeneous board
electorates. And they have not been destroyed by voting cycles. As discussed in
Part II, the arguments against employee representation were already in trouble
on their own theoretical terms; the presence of a significant, well-functioning
counterexample should be decisive. Those committed to the proposition that
economic and social choice theory somehow dictate the exclusive shareholder
franchise need to overhaul their old arguments or come up with some new ones.
Codetermination also serves as a kind of proof-of-concept when it comes to
our model of shared corporate governance. The arguments we make in favor of
adding employee representatives to corporate boards, just as the arguments
against, are largely theoretical. They necessarily sweep quite broadly, and don’t
attend to many of the mechanical details of how to best structure a shared
governance system, much less how to get from here to there. Germany provides
an example of how such a system might work. And recent research suggests that
it’s working quite well for a variety of corporate constituents, including
shareholders.

340

Chen Lin, Thomas Schmid & Yuhai Xuan, Employee Representation and Financial
Leverage, 127 J. FIN. ECON. 303, 321 (2018).
341
See id. at 43-44.
342
See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 312, at 188.
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V. CONCLUSION
We have reached a critical point in the development of the corporation.
Investors, long assumed to be uncomplicated profit-maximizers, are looking for
ways to express a wider range of values in allocating their funds. Employees are
agitating for greater say at their workplaces—resisting mandatory arbitration
clauses, objecting to corporate expressions of political and religious views, and
questioning the distribution of the profits of their labor. In turn, state and federal
politicians are beginning to respond to these issues both on their own terms and,
more significantly, by thinking more broadly about the fundamental structure of
corporate governance.
At the same time, the intellectual foundations of the modern corporation
continue to disintegrate. The law-and-economics justifications for some of the
core features of the modern corporation—the shareholder primacy norm and the
exclusive shareholder franchise—have been exposed. Those arguments, it turns
out, are based on flawed assumptions about the nature of shareholder
preferences, misapply basic social choice theory, and are often inconsistent with
some of the fundamental precepts of standard economics that are purported to
support them. Their proponents are now at the point where they are unwilling to
defend these arguments and yet strangely reluctant to abandon them, choosing
instead to continue to rely on them without comment. The way we have
constructed the modern corporation is under a great deal of pressure, from within
and without.
As we are forced to move away from the existing corporate order, we need
to acknowledge the shortcomings (and the strengths) of its intellectual
framework and begin to develop new models of firm governance. In this Article,
we have cataloged the arguments for the exclusive shareholder franchise and,
one by one, found them lacking, usually on their own terms. We then presented
a new model of corporate governance that builds on eighty years of research into
the nature of the firm and finds further support in a new theory of democratic
participation that ensures the proper aggregation of constituent preferences
through accurate and manageable markers. In sum, this article sets out the
intellectual framework that will allow investors, employees, and policymakers
to navigate the collapse of the shareholder primacy norm and, at the same time,
provides a positive argument for the inclusion of workers in the future of
corporate governance.
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